Libyans in Benghazi celebrate the fall of Tripoli with fireworks
David Davis’s call for a Marshall Plan in the Middle East (Prospect, July 2011) has been echoed by Hillary Clinton, Tony Blair and General Jim Jones. Although the Marshall Plan did not cover Japan, the great success of the US and its allies in introducing democracy and a free economy into both Japan and Germany are widely cited as proof of what can be done with economic aid. But what was possible in those countries, at the end of the second world war, highlights precisely what cannot be done now in the Middle East—and why.
For a start, Germany and Japan had surrendered after defeat in a war. There were none of the terrorist and rocket attacks that western forces would be sure to encounter if they sought to play a similar role in, say, Sudan or Yemen, or even post-Gaddafi Libya. After Iraq and Afghanistan, few will even consider the idea of the west occupying more lands in the Middle East and managing their transformation. While the German and Japanese reconstructions were hands-on projects, those now being considered amount to long-distance social engineering; the west providing funds and advice, but the execution left largely to locals.
Germany and Japan were also strong nation-states before the second world war, whereas the first loyalty of citizens in many Middle Eastern countries, made up of tribal societies cobbled together by colonial powers, is to their ethnic or confessional group—so people tend to fight for their tribe’s share, rather than make sacrifices for the whole. Deep hostilities, such as those between the Shia and the Sunnis, Pashtun and Tajik, and various tribes in other nations either gridlock the national polities (as in Iraq and Afghanistan), lead to large-scale violence (Yemen, Bahrain, and Sudan), result in massive oppression and armed conflicts (Libya and Syria), or otherwise hinder political and economic development.
In the early 20th century Max Weber established the importance of values when he argued that Protestants were more imbued than Catholics with the values that lead to hard work and high levels of saving, essential for the rise of modern capitalist economies. For decades, developments in Catholic countries (in southern Europe and Latin America) lagged behind the Protestant Anglo-Saxon nations and those in northwest Europe. Similarly, Weber pointed to the difference between Confucian and Muslim values, thus, in effect, predicting the striking difference between the very high rates of development of the South Asian “tigers”—China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, and South Korea—and low rates of Muslim states, especially those that adhere strictly to Sharia.
Moreover, Germany and Japan were developed countries before the second world war, with strong industrial bases, good infrastructure and educated populations. They had mainly to be re-constructed. Many Middle Eastern states lack such assets, so must be constructed in the first place—a much taller order. This is most obvious in Afghanistan, Yemen, Sudan, and Libya. But is also a major issue in nations that have drawn on one commodity, oil, without developing the bases for a modern economy, especially Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. Other nations, such as Tunisia, Pakistan, Morocco, Syria and Egypt, have better-prepared populations and resources, but still score poorly compared to postwar Germany and Japan.
Finally, the advocates of a new Marshall Plan disregard the small matter of costs. During the Marshall Plan’s first year, it demanded 13 per cent of the US budget. Today, foreign aid commands less than 1 per cent and, in the current climate, America and its allies are more inclined to cut such overseas expenditure than to increase them. Both the west and the Middle East would be better off if it is made clear that nations emerging from the Arab Spring will have to rely primarily on themselves—and maybe on their oil-rich brethren—to “reconstruct” their economies and build their polities. Arguing otherwise merely leads to disappointment and disillusion—on both sides.
David Davis’s call for a Marshall Plan in the Middle East (Prospect, July 2011) has been echoed by Hillary Clinton, Tony Blair and General Jim Jones. Although the Marshall Plan did not cover Japan, the great success of the US and its allies in introducing democracy and a free economy into both Japan and Germany are widely cited as proof of what can be done with economic aid. But what was possible in those countries, at the end of the second world war, highlights precisely what cannot be done now in the Middle East—and why.
For a start, Germany and Japan had surrendered after defeat in a war. There were none of the terrorist and rocket attacks that western forces would be sure to encounter if they sought to play a similar role in, say, Sudan or Yemen, or even post-Gaddafi Libya. After Iraq and Afghanistan, few will even consider the idea of the west occupying more lands in the Middle East and managing their transformation. While the German and Japanese reconstructions were hands-on projects, those now being considered amount to long-distance social engineering; the west providing funds and advice, but the execution left largely to locals.
Germany and Japan were also strong nation-states before the second world war, whereas the first loyalty of citizens in many Middle Eastern countries, made up of tribal societies cobbled together by colonial powers, is to their ethnic or confessional group—so people tend to fight for their tribe’s share, rather than make sacrifices for the whole. Deep hostilities, such as those between the Shia and the Sunnis, Pashtun and Tajik, and various tribes in other nations either gridlock the national polities (as in Iraq and Afghanistan), lead to large-scale violence (Yemen, Bahrain, and Sudan), result in massive oppression and armed conflicts (Libya and Syria), or otherwise hinder political and economic development.
In the early 20th century Max Weber established the importance of values when he argued that Protestants were more imbued than Catholics with the values that lead to hard work and high levels of saving, essential for the rise of modern capitalist economies. For decades, developments in Catholic countries (in southern Europe and Latin America) lagged behind the Protestant Anglo-Saxon nations and those in northwest Europe. Similarly, Weber pointed to the difference between Confucian and Muslim values, thus, in effect, predicting the striking difference between the very high rates of development of the South Asian “tigers”—China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, and South Korea—and low rates of Muslim states, especially those that adhere strictly to Sharia.
Moreover, Germany and Japan were developed countries before the second world war, with strong industrial bases, good infrastructure and educated populations. They had mainly to be re-constructed. Many Middle Eastern states lack such assets, so must be constructed in the first place—a much taller order. This is most obvious in Afghanistan, Yemen, Sudan, and Libya. But is also a major issue in nations that have drawn on one commodity, oil, without developing the bases for a modern economy, especially Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. Other nations, such as Tunisia, Pakistan, Morocco, Syria and Egypt, have better-prepared populations and resources, but still score poorly compared to postwar Germany and Japan.
Finally, the advocates of a new Marshall Plan disregard the small matter of costs. During the Marshall Plan’s first year, it demanded 13 per cent of the US budget. Today, foreign aid commands less than 1 per cent and, in the current climate, America and its allies are more inclined to cut such overseas expenditure than to increase them. Both the west and the Middle East would be better off if it is made clear that nations emerging from the Arab Spring will have to rely primarily on themselves—and maybe on their oil-rich brethren—to “reconstruct” their economies and build their polities. Arguing otherwise merely leads to disappointment and disillusion—on both sides.
