Gordon Brown's portrait in 10 Downing Street, slightly below Blair's. © Dan Kitwood/PA Archive/Press Association Images
“Too. Many. Mistakes. Too. Many. Mistakes.” This was the phrase repeated by Gordon Brown when he was Prime Minister as he thumped the desk in front of him in time to the mantra.The biggest political mistake of all, of course, was the decision not to call an election in 2007—having let all around him hype up the possibility for weeks on end. It was the end of his reputation as a statesmanlike “father of the nation” and a return to the idea that he was a tactical leader, indecisive, tortured and driven by self-interest.It was also the beginning of the Conservative recovery, following George Osborne’s surprise party conference announcement of an inheritance tax cut, shifting the balance of power at Westminster. Labour was never ahead in the polls again after the election-that-never-was. Damian McBride, in his book Power Trip, describes this as “the greatest misjudgement of Brown’s long career, utterly changing the way he was perceived and defined.”But what if Brown had called an election in 2007, seeking his own mandate soon after taking over the leadership from Tony Blair? The widespread assumption, including among many Labour MPs, is that Brown would have won a clear victory. Labour’s private polling at the time predicted a 20-seat majority—not as good as the landslides previously won by Blair but a respectable outcome. That is why Brown failed to close the running story down.
In fact, though, the result would almost certainly have been much closer. Even before the election had been abandoned the Conservatives’ private polling was already pointing to a hung parliament—according to Philip Cowley, professor of parliamentary government at Nottingham University, one internal Tory poll of 120 target constituencies at the time predicted that the Conservative Party would gain almost 90 seats (around 70 from Labour and 20 from the Liberal Democrats).
The personal bounce experienced by Brown on first becoming Prime Minister would have collapsed under the pressure of an election campaign—the inability to connect with voters, revealed by the famous encounter with Gillian Duffy over immigration in 2010, would have come out in another way.
Osborne would have produced some populist policies and the voters would have wondered why they were being asked to go to the polls again, just two years after the previous election. A hung parliament—probably with Labour as the biggest party— would have been a more likely result than an overall majority for Brown.
The Labour leader, frustrated but not humiliated, would have formed a coalition with his old friend from Scotland, Menzies Campbell, then leader of the Liberal Democrats. They would have embarked on a programme including the abolition of tuition fees, big cuts in inheritance tax and stamp duty, as well as a major constitutional reform plan covering the House of Lords, the voting system and MPs’ second jobs, recreating the “progressive alliance” once dreamt of by Paddy Ashdown and Blair.
The Tories, meanwhile would have gone into meltdown, ejecting Cameron in favour of a more right-wing leader—perhaps David Davis, who was then shadow home secretary and would have committed his party to an early referendum on Europe.
The political backdrop to the economic crash of 2008 would then have been completely different. Instead of setting out to “save the world” the Prime Minister would have been distracted by domestic politics, with a tetchy party and a divided government. The Lib-Lab coalition would have probably collapsed eventually under the pressure of events—Brown is a far less collegiate politician than Cameron and even his relationship with the Labour Chancellor Alistair Darling became almost impossible.
Already, though, the damage to both parties’ reputation for economic competence would have been done by being in charge at the time of a monumental banking crisis that led to a deep and lasting recession. Even if Brown managed to hang on as Prime Minister, by the time an election came—possibly in 2011—the Tories would have been the only clear opposition, with no space for the UK Independence Party to shave off voters on the right. Both Labour and the Lib Dems would have been punished at the polls.
Prime Minister David Davis would have embarked on a swingeing austerity programme and held an immediate referendum on the European Union, campaigning for Britain to leave. With the eurozone in crisis, business held in low regard and the new Labour leader Ed Miliband failing to break through, the United Kingdom would have decided to get out. In the subsequent independence vote in Scotland, Scots, appalled by the result of the EU referendum and Thatcherite cuts programme, would have voted to separate from England.
Perhaps it wasn’t such a mistake, for the UK overall at least, not to call the election in 2007 after all.
In fact, though, the result would almost certainly have been much closer. Even before the election had been abandoned the Conservatives’ private polling was already pointing to a hung parliament—according to Philip Cowley, professor of parliamentary government at Nottingham University, one internal Tory poll of 120 target constituencies at the time predicted that the Conservative Party would gain almost 90 seats (around 70 from Labour and 20 from the Liberal Democrats).
The personal bounce experienced by Brown on first becoming Prime Minister would have collapsed under the pressure of an election campaign—the inability to connect with voters, revealed by the famous encounter with Gillian Duffy over immigration in 2010, would have come out in another way.
Osborne would have produced some populist policies and the voters would have wondered why they were being asked to go to the polls again, just two years after the previous election. A hung parliament—probably with Labour as the biggest party— would have been a more likely result than an overall majority for Brown.
The Labour leader, frustrated but not humiliated, would have formed a coalition with his old friend from Scotland, Menzies Campbell, then leader of the Liberal Democrats. They would have embarked on a programme including the abolition of tuition fees, big cuts in inheritance tax and stamp duty, as well as a major constitutional reform plan covering the House of Lords, the voting system and MPs’ second jobs, recreating the “progressive alliance” once dreamt of by Paddy Ashdown and Blair.
The Tories, meanwhile would have gone into meltdown, ejecting Cameron in favour of a more right-wing leader—perhaps David Davis, who was then shadow home secretary and would have committed his party to an early referendum on Europe.
The political backdrop to the economic crash of 2008 would then have been completely different. Instead of setting out to “save the world” the Prime Minister would have been distracted by domestic politics, with a tetchy party and a divided government. The Lib-Lab coalition would have probably collapsed eventually under the pressure of events—Brown is a far less collegiate politician than Cameron and even his relationship with the Labour Chancellor Alistair Darling became almost impossible.
Already, though, the damage to both parties’ reputation for economic competence would have been done by being in charge at the time of a monumental banking crisis that led to a deep and lasting recession. Even if Brown managed to hang on as Prime Minister, by the time an election came—possibly in 2011—the Tories would have been the only clear opposition, with no space for the UK Independence Party to shave off voters on the right. Both Labour and the Lib Dems would have been punished at the polls.
Prime Minister David Davis would have embarked on a swingeing austerity programme and held an immediate referendum on the European Union, campaigning for Britain to leave. With the eurozone in crisis, business held in low regard and the new Labour leader Ed Miliband failing to break through, the United Kingdom would have decided to get out. In the subsequent independence vote in Scotland, Scots, appalled by the result of the EU referendum and Thatcherite cuts programme, would have voted to separate from England.
Perhaps it wasn’t such a mistake, for the UK overall at least, not to call the election in 2007 after all.
