In mid-July, astronomers announced that they had unexpectedly found a new planet, in the constellation of Cygnus. Unexpected because conditions in the new planet's solar system looked wrong for the formation of planets. "It shouldn't be there," said Patrick Moore.
This was rather like the reaction of Iran experts to the unexpected election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to the Iranian presidency at the end of June. The accepted wisdom had been that former president Hashemi Rafsanjani would win. Surely there must have been something wrong with the results? There was probably some intimidation of voters and some ballot boxes were perhaps stuffed, particularly in more remote parts of the country. Some revolutionary guard corps generals have been accused of electoral fraud. And of course the vote was not properly free: only candidates approved by the hardline guardian council were allowed to stand. But a large majority of the 60 per cent who turned out in the last round of the elections voted for Ahmadinejad. He represents a genuine movement of opinion among the Iranian people.
This applies particularly among the poor. Unemployment in Iran is officially 16 per cent but is probably higher. These people felt abandoned by the system. They voted for Mohammad Khatami's reform programme in 1997 when he promised change, but saw little benefit, despite a rise in oil prices and the consequent windfall in government revenues. Instead, they saw the reformists deadlocked with the hardline leadership of supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei over issues remote from their interests, like press freedom and reform of the judiciary. They also saw officials, politicians and others profiting from the system while they suffered. More than anyone else, Hashemi Rafsanjani, president between 1989 and 1997, and the other candidate in the last round of the recent elections, represented this profiteering for many Iranians.
Ahmadinejad promised punishment for the corrupt "mafia," and redistribution of oil wealth. In contrast to Rafsanjani, with his marble palaces and reluctance to campaign outside Tehran, Ahmadinejad lived in a small flat, campaigned around the country, and had a reputation as a competent former mayor of Tehran who got things done. For many Iranians, Ahmadinejad's religious statements and references to the early principles of the Islamic revolution chimed with his humble way of life and his promises to help the poor, and were the more effective for the fact he is not a cleric.
How will Ahmadinejad conduct his government when his presidency formally begins in early August? There are few clear indications of what his policies will be. He has not yet announced his cabinet. His hardline political connections and his harsher statements, for example on human rights, prompt concern that some of Khatami's real achievements, notably his reform of the repressive ministry of information and security, may be reversed. But the new president also faces a number of difficult challenges.
Soon the European states who have been discussing the nuclear problem with the Iranians will present a set of new proposals. If the Iranian response is unsatisfactory, the question will probably pass to the UN security council, where the US will take a hard line. This is an awkward moment for a new Iranian administration to take over. Several of the previous Iranian negotiators had strong links to Rafsanjani. Will they be confirmed in their responsibilities? Will Ahmadinejad insist on a tougher position in the negotiations (he has spoken strongly in favour of Iran's right to use nuclear power for peaceful purposes)? It seems likely that the Iranian leadership as a whole, including Ahmadinejad, will agree a pragmatic course in foreign relations generally, and in the nuclear discussions in particular, and will perhaps try to pocket some benefit from the shock and uncertainty caused in the west by the presidential elections.
But domestic policy and the economy will be Ahmadinejad's crucial political test. Here he cannot follow the usual, pragmatic course. He has to deliver on his promises to stop profiteers and improve the lives of the poor. The problem is that there is no way to do this for real without damaging powerful vested interests and stirring up serious political trouble.
On the face of it, an obvious target would be the Bonyads – rich charitable foundations with tax-free incomes and involvement in prosperous parts of the economy like the oil industry. But when Khatami tried to take control of them, he ran up against their powerful connections: the Bonyads are in the pocket of supreme leader Khamenei and are important for patronage and influence on the hardline side of the regime. Ahmadinejad has stressed his deference to Khamenei on several occasions, and is therefore unlikely to attack the Bonyads.
The new president could go after the wealthy class represented by former president Rafsanjani. But Rafsanjani's supporters are entrenched in all the main institutions of Iran. A sustained attack on their interests could bring about something like a civil war within the government: they know most of the regime's dirty secrets.
Ahmadinejad could make an example of one or two symbolic figures, and offer up a few minor changes (there are rumours that small traders will be offered low-interest loans). But the mass of the unemployed will not be satisfied with that. Ahmadinejad succeeded in the election by making them some big promises, and if he lets them down, he will be in trouble. And his close identification with the supreme leader could, if problems arise, cause difficulties for the Islamic regime as a whole.
The reformists in Iran who supported Khatami with such optimism in 1997 performed badly in these elections. They failed to unite behind a single candidate, or to speak to Iran's underprivileged, or to address the unease that another reformist president would simply end up in deadlock with the hardline leadership again, like Khatami. Many reformist voters simply boycotted the election altogether: presumably many of them now rue the outcome. Even in a flawed democracy like that of Iran, there are no prizes for those who don't take part. Perhaps the jolt of these elections will give the reformists an impulse to greater political engagement, but the question is whether they will be able to exploit future opportunities - assuming, that is, that Ahmadinejad and the leadership circle around Khamenei offer them any.
