Allies—at least for the middle part of the 20th century—China and Russia have a much longer history of distrust and antipathy. These days, as one Chinese scholar some years ago explained, the relationship is based on decent personal links between Russian president Vladimir Putin and Chinese leader Xi Jinping. The question after the brutal invasion of Ukraine is just how deep this personal chemistry runs.
China has shown signs of confusion over Putin’s behaviour. The manner in which it has tried to square its historic commitment to respect for others’ territorial integrity with non-interference in their internal affairs has been pushed to the limit by Russia’s attack on a country that Beijing not only recognises as sovereign, but sees as a promising market for trade and investment. With 60,000 Chinese nationals in Ukraine at the start of the invasion, and with substantial grain and energy exports at stake, the ongoing military onslaught from Moscow puts these links in jeopardy. When it comes to its own self-interest, China starts to scowl rather than smile.
On top of this, Russia’s horrific actions have done the last thing that Beijing wanted: they have unified the west. The US, Europe and their allies have, for the first time in a generation, been forced not just to speak about their values, but actually behave as though they believed in them through imposing dramatic sanctions and offering help. Russia’s aggression has pushed China onto the backfoot and shown that, far from being an international leader in waiting, ready to supplant the US, proactive global leadership is the last thing it desires or is ready to assume.
For those forever quaking at the looming China threat and railing against the “hidden hand” emanating from Beijing, readying itself to remake the current global order, they can now relax a bit. Putin has exposed the fact that no such grand plans exist, and that China was simply not wired to even dream of taking up the role. So far its diplomatic response has been a mixture of confusion, desperately trying to reconcile allegiance to Russia with preservation of its own interests and hiding behind language which attempts to be neutral, but has ended up sounding disingenuous and conflicted.
Lazy attempts to parallel Russia and Ukraine with China and Taiwan have been unhelpful. Only a few days into what could be a long, horrible and tragic war, all a cool-headed strategist sitting in Beijing knows for sure is that military options are unpredictable, chaotic and trigger revulsion in the international community. None of the things on this list are remotely in China’s interests, as it moves into what Xi’s government calls its new era of renaissance and rejuvenation. In many ways, Russia, with an economy one sixth the size of its neighbour’s, has spoiled the People’s Republic’s party. It is hard to imagine that Putin candidly set out his real intentions to Xi when they met during the Winter Olympics in Beijing. Had he done so, one wonders just how quickly the VIP treatment might have ended.
China is a rational actor, and a deliberative one, despite worries about the often emotional tone of its rhetoric. Russia versus Ukraine is a land war. China versus Taiwan would involve amphibious landings, against an island formidably well-defended and with a population even more hostile to violent coercion. The spirited and courageous manner in which Ukrainians, despite the huge odds against them, have fought over the last few days will underline to China that in war, morale and moral justification are powerful weapons. The newfound western unity will also give it pause for thought.
There are scenarios going forward in which China could play a transformative role in the Ukraine conflict. Putin’s reckless nuclear threats will frighten Beijing as much as other capitals, while global economic implosion is the last thing it wants as it struggles to maintain decent growth and eliminate Covid. All of this might inspire it to use the one advantage it still has—relations with Russia unsullied in recent years by the resentment and distrust that have afflicted Putin’s links with the west. Some suggest Russia could become a semi-vassal state to the People’s Republic because of total reliance for energy sales and finance after the rest of the world turns its back. But the last thing China would want is that kind of unstable dependence.
Xi is so often said to have a good relationship with Putin. Might he persuade the Russian president to seek a diplomatic, and peaceful, resolution in Ukraine? At the moment, the likelihood looks very remote. But China is above all opportunistic. Using its leverage with Russia to calm the current situation would dramatically improve Beijing’s global image, earn it the reputation of global mediator, and demonstrate to domestic audiences that the country’s moment as a true global player has arrived. Fanciful thinking, perhaps—but if things get even worse, self-interest might prompt China to do unexpected things.
