One
Friday in mid-July, Tony Blair left the Westminster village for one of his regular journeys to another country-the regions of Britain. He set off on a short tour of the northeast, accompanied by a small team of detectives, civil servants and Labour party officials. Hurtling around in planes and cars, they squeezed in seven visits in five hours. Tagging along-with the purpose of grabbing a foreign affairs interview with Blair on the plane to Teeside-I also caught a glimpse of a rather uplifting corner of British political life. Here was the most powerful man in the country addressing a few small gatherings with an appealing lack of formality. Some venues were barely two-thirds full. People seemed pleased to see him but they were not overawed-he has a verbal rather than a physical charisma and carries his office lightly. There were neither cheering crowds nor angry demos. This is home turf for Blair-two events were in his own Sedgefield constituency, where people are used to seeing a prime minister. But would such a low key be possible in America or France where Blair's equivalent is also head of state?
On these trips, politics seems to revert to an earlier age when a national leader was listened to respectfully. The leader would in turn hear the worries of his people and go away to ruminate on them. On the road, Blair is the wise headmaster, praising and encouraging his pupils, rather than the hectoring and defensive figure he sometimes is in London. In his short speeches he fluently connects the school, office or new recycling plant to national and international themes. His words at the opening of a shopping centre in the former mining town of Easington sounded a bit overblown-can one mall really be the cause of such a renaissance?-but they went down well with local dignitaries. At a Darlington primary school he was subjected to a junior prime minister's question time, where one child asked: "Do you like being rich?" After the nervous laughter had subsided, Blair established that he was only "well off" and turned the question around to the importance of working hard at school to earn a decent income. He ducked the follow-up on pocket money, saying that was a Cherie matter. Later, he spent 15 minutes chatting to the teachers. They were confident and didn't pull their punches. Class sizes are down, but their big complaint is that they have to absorb too many special needs children without an increase in staffing.
At a noon Q&A session with local business leaders in a country hotel, he calmed anxieties about an unpopular EU chemicals directive and gave a short account of the pensions crisis. He also launched into a defence of labour market deregulation in response to an engineering employer's complaint about factories being easier and cheaper to close here than on the continent. It may be easier to close them here, said Blair, but that's why we get so many more of them opening.
It struck me while he said this that people may be right to think of Blair as a British Christian democrat. Here he was lecturing businessmen on the virtues of the market, having earlier reached for social democratic rhetoric about the failings of a country that only educates its elite. And there is something about seeing him in the northeast-where region seems to subsume class-that contributes to the impression. Blair represents one of the most blue collar constituencies in the country, yet, like a good Christian democrat, he rejects the idea of class-there is individual, community and nation. Perhaps that is all there can be, at least in public, for a national leader.
It turned out that the "private" Q&A session had been broadcast on the hotel's public address system. No one was worried and there was only a wedding party to listen in. Lunch was taken with Blair's down-to-earth political agent John Burton. He is getting anxious about the number of people he meets who think that because a euro is worth 63p that is all they will get for every ?1 if we join. It's not quite the G8.
On the way back to London I got a few more minutes with him. His defensive inflection ("Look, what you guys don't grasp...") had given way to a more expansive tone, as if refreshed by the brief immersion in ordinary lives. It has not been a good few months. The initiative won by the budget in April drifted away on a tide of tittle-tattle. The hawks seem to be in charge in Washington. Yet here is a politician at the top of his game. A year ago he won a second landslide and he's not yet 50. He has reshaped British politics, if not yet Britain, and is Europe's heaviest hitter. He knows what he is up to and has the intellectual confidence to describe it, albeit in the flip, difference-splitting cadences of the third way. The relentless buoyancy of the public Blair must be wearying, but it doesn't show. As soon as we land he is whisked off to Chequers for a long weekend wrestling with the public spending review. And so to the rest of the world...
David Goodhart: Is the Atlantic widening?
Tony Blair: There is always a certain scratchiness in the Europe/America relationship and that scratchiness is rather evident at present. But look at the big picture-much more unites us than divides us: values, economics, and so on. People are talking about rifts between Britain and the US, but that's absurd. Yes, there are differences, we have trade disputes and so on, but we have disputes with other European countries and it doesn't mean that our relationship is not very close. You can hugely exaggerate this and I counsel people, especially on the centre-left, not to go along with it because it is very ideological. People on the right want to set Anglo-Saxon and European culture apart, some people on the left want to rip up the relationship because they are anti-American. Both are wrong. When Europe and America stand together the world is safer and more stable; when they come apart, the world becomes quite a dangerous place.
DG: How much influence do you have with Bush?
TB: I never like to talk about it in that way-it either looks as if you are some sort of supplicant for the ear of the president or you're boasting about your position. It's for other people to judge. All I can say is that both with the last administration and with this one we have enjoyed an extremely close co-operative relationship and agreed on most things.
DG: Surely the divide is more serious than you imply. Your own doctrine of international community stresses international law, the belief that America cannot do it all, the importance of the UN, the importance of global justice. The doctrine developing in Washington is very different and much more sceptical about partnership and international law. There have been big differences in the past-Suez in 1956, France leaving Nato in 1966, or the arguments over Bosnia in the early 1990s-but these were specific disputes involving particular countries. Now there is no cold war to bind us together, and the differences are both more ideological and seem to set the whole of Europe against America.
TB: Look... I think there are two factors that give rise to this view. One is rhetorical. Politics is different in America. This is a Republican administration with a certain view, so they will couch what they do in terms of US national interest, not international community. But the doctrine of international community is just enlightened national self-interest, so whatever the different rhetorical perspectives you come to the same point. The second point is that America takes certain views for particular reasons. These are not necessarily irrational or wrong. For example, America believes that the International Criminal Court will put at risk its peacekeepers. Those fears are perfectly valid and I believe that we have met them. But it's not that America is saying that they don't want to have anything to do with international law, they're not saying we hate the idea of an ICC, they're saying that they're not prepared to put their people at risk-you can exaggerate the implications of that.
DG: So, you think that as global hegemon America has a special role and therefore special rights...
TB: ... they are also a target for particular types of attack. But a way will be found through this dispute. The Americans have pointed out that France has got a seven year opt-out from prosecution for its troops. The point is that because of America's genuinely special position, people tend to exaggerate the extent to which the US is saying we don't care what the rest of the world thinks. America did not have to build an international coalition over Afghanistan, but it did.
DG: The attack on Iraq which now just seems a matter of time will surely create further dissonance between Europe and America?
TB: It depends on what happens. I repeat the demand that the weapons inspectors are let back into Iraq unconditionally. The UN is pressing Saddam to fulfil his obligations; he is refusing to do so.
DG: There seems to be a widely held expert view that he doesn't yet have deliverable weapons of mass destruction. Is the fact that he might be trying to develop them sufficient grounds for an invasion?
TB: If the time comes for action, people will have the evidence presented to them. But be in no doubt at all that he is certainly trying to acquire weapons of mass destruction, in particular a nuclear capability.
DG: Iran is a bigger bone of contention between the US and Britain. They regard Iran as even more dangerous than Iraq; we think Iran is reformable. Jack Straw's first visit as foreign secretary was to Iran.
TB: There are all sorts of historical reasons why America takes such a view of Iran. Most people think that it is worth trying to engage with Iran, but with your eyes completely open. I find no strain in our relationship with America as a result of our overtures to the moderate elements in Iran.
DG: Is it possible for America to be too powerful? Does Europe need to balance her?
TB: I don't get into that... I basically believe that America is a force for good in the world, but I certainly think it helps if we can be a proper strategic partner of America. There is a huge amount happening out there-Russia is moving westward, a really important and welcome development, and you've got the emergence of China and India.
DG: Europe doesn't seem very relevant to any of that. You said Europe was a superpower not a superstate, but it doesn't feel like one.
TB: I didn't say that Europe was a superpower, I said it could become one. But this is the heart of it. My challenge to Europe is this: if we want to have greater sway and greater power, then instead of complaining about America, we've got to face up to what we need to do. That means developing a coherent defence capability and a set of institutions to allow Europe to speak strongly. That's why the EU's constitutional convention is so important. The rest of the world needs to know who speaks for Europe. If you want to be taken seriously, you have got to act seriously. Some of the criticism of America comes from an irritation with their huge superpower status. In Kosovo, 85 per cent of the assets were American.
DG: Try a thought experiment. What will the EU look like, geopolitically, in 20 years time?
TB: I believe it will develop as a Europe of nation states, not as a federal superstate. If we pool our sovereignty in a way that gives us a strong voice and, if we improve our defence capability, we will be the strategic partner that America needs and wants. That's why it's so important for Britain to play a full role in Europe. People are cynical about the bridge role between Britain and America, but that is what we can and should be. It's nonsense that we have to make a choice. Making a choice-rather than keeping a strong role on both sides of the Atlantic-would diminish our power. Europe has its problems but they're solvable. Take a step back. Countries are integrating fast, ten new countries are about to join. The European economy has got its challenges, but it's not in bad shape. Twenty years ahead, Europe will have the clear leadership and the defence capability I have been talking about. Countries will still have their own foreign and defence policies, no one will give that up. But we will be able to operate at a European level when we want to in a Nato-friendly way. The rapid reaction force has been held up to get the last bit of this relationship between the EU and Nato sorted out. Yes, there are still difficulties between Greece and Turkey, but they will be sorted out.
DG: Do you have a personal interest in the post of a president of Europe that has been proposed?
TB: No, that's not the issue. The point is that you can't go on any longer with this six month rotating presidency-it's absurd, and I think there is a broad acceptance of that now. We must have a strong head of the council of ministers. But the interests of the small countries have to be looked after too; it can't be seen as big countries ganging up against small.
DG: So who is standing in the way of these things?
TB: No one really, it is just a matter of doing it. On the rapid reaction force, once we've sorted out the politics, we need to focus on equipment, strategic lift, how you configure the force.
DG: What about the UN? There is a perception that it lacks credibility and that it is ignored by the US.
TB: I think Kofi Annan is a very fine leader. When people say that the UN lacks credibility, sometimes they expect too much. It can only do what it's permitted to do and it's actually more effective than people give it credit for.
DG: The Nepad new deal for Africa offered little in new financial aid, but it includes radical promises to open the west's agricultural markets. Yet it was signed by Bush, who has just raised US farm subsidies, and Chirac, who is the big obstacle to reform of the CAP. On the African side, people like Mugabe and Gadafy have signed up to all sorts of good governance promises that everyone knows they ignore. So it's basically an unbelievable document.
TB: Well, Mugabe is not going to benefit from Nepad precisely because he is in breach of its commitments. But as you say there is a lot more in the document than people realise. The job now is to deliver it. That's what we've got to try to do.
DG: A couple of issues that connect the foreign and the domestic. Is the Atlantic bridge role central to your attempt to persuade the sceptical British to journey deeper into Europe? You sell the euro partly on the basis that we have this other dimension-the Anglosphere, the special relationship-which prevents us sinking into a euro-swamp.
TB: But this is not just a presentational thing-it is about the one reinforcing the other. It is pie-in-the-sky sentimentality to think that America will deal with Britain simply on the basis of old ties of history. These geopolitical relationships are relationships of power and therefore if we are powerful within Europe we are of greater use as an ally to America. It works the other way too. If Europe knows that on issues of foreign and security policy America speaks most intimately to the British, that's helpful to us within Europe. To repeat, these exaggerations about Europe and America splitting apart are driven partly by the right-wing press. They are desperate to show that our commitment to Europe must mean a separation from the US.
DG: Migration looms large both internationally and domestically. Britain now absorbs nearly 200,000 net migrants each year. Are you happy with that?
TB: It is not a question of adopting some specific figure but of making sure that the system under which people enter the country has integrity. The problem with the asylum system is that it does not. It is abused by people who are economic migrants-there's nothing wrong with being an economic migrant, but they should come in through the normal channels. There are positive benefits from immigration, but we must get the system right.
DG: Some people argue that the Geneva Convention itself is an obstacle to a just asylum system. Because signatories are obliged to give due consideration to any application, however ill-founded, it creates a huge backlog to the disadvantage of genuine cases. Should it be repealed, as Jack Straw has suggested?
TB: The whole international legal infrastructure of asylum is in my view out of date and we should be reviewing the whole thing. It was fashioned for a different world. There is a general acceptance internationally that it's got to be altered. There is also a certain amount we can do in changing our own laws and that's what we're trying to do now.
DG: David Marquand recently praised you in Prospect for prising the British flag and the idea of the nation from the Tories. He said you were developing a form of "progressive nationalism." Are you?
TB: Yeah... there is a patriotism today that has developed in Britain that is not backward-looking and is not insular-in which people can feel comfortable with the British flag and with Britain as a country, from whatever political or ethnic background they are from. I think that's great, we should welcome it.
DG: There is anxiety in some government circles about "poor whites," in particular white working-class males in their twenties and thirties. They are not keen on multiculturalism, they are out of education and don't use the NHS much, so are untouched by your political themes. Do you share the worry?
TB: There will always be some groups whom you can't reach. I guess we try to appeal on jobs, on crime policy, over time through education. But I don't really break people up into those sorts of groups.
DG: It is sometimes said that all your tinkering with the public services will not be able to change much because the underlying problem is a cultural one. Britain has become the most secular, hedonistic country in Europe and there are too few people with a strong sense of service to others; a critical mass of such people is essential in the face-to-face services like health and education. Do you agree?
TB: No, I don't think I do. You saw those teachers today. Some of them are the most committed people you will meet. I think the public service ethos is quite strong in Britain. It is true that public service professionals have felt undervalued because of years of underinvestment but that's changing... I guess people do lead more pressured lives these days-with the pace of modern life it is harder sometimes for people to spare time for others.
DG: Are you disappointed that the third way has not taken root as an idea or a political philosophy?
TB: People have not tried to understand it here. But in other countries, in parts of South America for example, it is seen as a ground-breaking moment for the centre-left. It is modern progressive politics.
DG: It really grew out of Clintonian triangulation did it not? It has a very political root.
TB: Yes it does. But a political philosophy should have a political application otherwise it's not much use. I would still defend it; indeed I could explain every part of what the government is doing today in third way terms. The third way position on foreign and security policy is to be totally pro-engagement, but strong on defence... It is not just triangulation-although pushing the right out of parts of the political territory has been important-it is about a redefinition of our means to get to quite traditional ends. The third way is not a political ideology separate from social democracy. We acknowledge the need for solidarity in the face of the insecurity created by globalisation, that's where the left's values are absolutely correct. But we also know that civic society cannot be based on handing things down from central government, it is about rights and responsibilities. You cannot be a government that redistributes wealth and opportunity unless you're running a strong, fiscally disciplined economy. You won't get public services turned around unless they are based on consumers. And you can't be a serious player in the world unless you're strong on defence.
DG: Do you feel insufficiently appreciated by the liberal thinking classes, many of them Prospect readers?
TB: I've sort of got over those thoughts-I'm way past that now. Look around Europe and those left standing are pretty much in the third way tradition: Sweden and Britain in particular. People say the left has been defeated all over Europe but it's only a year since we won a huge election victory. People will make their own judgements and so will history.
