Dear Charles
4th March 2003
The west is being lost. It would be wrong to attribute this solely to the deep divisions created by the Iraq crisis, but the latter is greatly accelerating trends which have been emerging in recent years. Last year, I still believed that the "west could be won," but I have lost that confidence. Allow me to explain. Take the Atlantic alliance: we have reached a point where the secretary of defence of Nato's lead nation not only compares Germany to Libya and Cuba but appears to relish creating fault lines between Nato's "old" and "new" European members: the US mission to overthrow Saddam is unmaking the alliance. Not that the Americans are alone in treating the alliance as a second-order artefact vis-?vis more important things. Schr? won his general election on a pacifist-cum-anti-American platform, while the French have taken a leaf from the Donald Rumsfeld manual of postmodern diplomacy in dealing with the "old" versus "new" Europe divide.
As for the European Union, we all knew that the reality of enlargement-15 members in 2002, 25 in 2004, 30 or so by the end of the decade-was going to change the whole integration process radically. Now we know just how radically. Most significant, perhaps, is that the Franco-German coupling has been rejected by a large proportion of the EU. This opens a third, uncharted, phase in the life of the EU: from 1950 to 1995 or so, it was dominated by the constant interaction between, on the one hand, the leading Franco-German couple and on the other, the rest of the member states. Then, from 1995 onwards, we had a stalled EU, owing to France and Germany's retreat to separate bedrooms. Last autumn, a new French-German mariage de raison appeared set to mould the work of the European convention, with proposals on defence, home affairs and, of course, the dual presidency. Although Iraq has been the proximate cause of the split between the "old" and the "new," the "letter of eight" European governments (followed by the "letter of ten") was, first and foremost, a reaction against this new-found French-German activism. The letters as such were not the issue-indeed the texts are rather anodyne. But the medium was the message: the French and Germans were deliberately excluded. This is not surprising, given some of the instigators of the whole exercise-the 'Wall Street Journal' and the political lobbyist Bruce Jackson-but the fact remains that half of Europe's countries followed the initiative.
I am going on about this Franco-German aspect, not simply out of Rhineland-European nostalgia-although I suppose I am entitled to that as I am half Luxembourgeois and an old hand in the Franco-German relationship. More fundamentally, we seem to be witnessing the end of the ambition toward the "ever closer union" called for in the treaty of Rome and, along with it, the end of the myth of European power. This was not solely a French idea: remember Tony Blair's "superpower, not a superstate" speech. The ambition to conjure up a common foreign and security policy may have been wholly unrealistic to begin with. Similarly, an Anglo-French rapid reaction force may have served little practical purpose except to antagonise the Americans, or, conversely, to make it easier for them to drop the onerous duties of peace-support missions in the Balkans in favour of more macho stuff.
Be that as it may: the objective of an ever closer union, with diplomatic, strategic and military powers, provided the EU with a sense of direction. Eurosceptics may have disliked it, but it has helped to make the EU much more than an intergovernmental organisation. However, with enlargement, and now with the current crisis, it is clear to me that the EU as a whole has no chance of exercising collective political and strategic power. The EU will essentially be a zone of peace, with the rule of law and free trade: in effect, Robert Kagan's Kantian paradise (see Prospect, August 2002). I hasten to add that these are no mean achievements, and certainly worth defending. They also have the benefit of resolving the issue of where the EU's borders lie: if a country fulfils the Copenhagen criteria, it can join the club; and therefore Morocco (which applied in 1987) or Tunisia or Israel, or a democratic Iraq may someday follow Turkey. I assume that some sort of geographic continuum will be seen as desirable, in order to avoid extending to New Zealand or Chile.
What's the problem with that, you may respond, beyond making a few old federalists a bit melancholy? Similarly, the irrelevance of Nato is not necessarily a matter of great distress: after all, it is at heart the US security guarantee towards individual European allies, not the multilateral Nato commitment, which counts. This, at any rate, seems to be the view of the "new" Europeans, who have had no qualms in following Rumsfeld's deliberate attempt to split the alliance. The fact remains that this is a wholly new vision of the transatlantic relationship; and we still have to decide what we do next with the EU.
Furthermore, this assumes that the US is part of the solution. Unfortunately, it is also part of the problem. Being pressed into fighting in America's war of choice against Iraq is something which has simply not been accepted by public opinion. When even Tony Blair cannot make the case, there may be something flawed about it. Beyond the current crisis, America's crusading "us or them" worldview is clearly not what other countries see as desirable, not to mention its anti-Kyoto, anti-international justice line.
We are now going to have to answer the most difficult set of questions we have had to face since the wise men of the 1940s built the world as we know it (the UN, Nato, the EU): how do the European countries cope with a loose-cannon America? What kind of framework for international relations do we envision now that the security council, the North Atlantic council and the EU's institutions (not to mention the convention) are severely challenged in their raisons d'?re?
Yours
François
Dear François
5th March 2003
I am less pessimistic than you. Of course, the current crisis is shaking the Atlantic alliance and the EU. Transatlantic relations will remain fragile for some time to come, but the EU's cracks are reparable. It is true that the US and Europe are drifting apart, but the basic interests of the European countries remain close.
The US is changing. George Bush and Donald Rumsfeld do not speak for all Americans. But their policies and style reflect the fact that the US now has different geopolitical priorities to Europe, and that a powerful current of American thinking takes a US-first attitude which denigrates international law and organisations-including the EU. For most of the past 50 years, the US has supported European integration. Now, the administration's hawks clearly prefer to divide and rule.
The French and the British offer two rival philosophies for dealing with American power. Since Blair came on the scene, both countries have called for more effective EU foreign and defence policies. The British want a stronger EU so that it can be a more useful partner to the US, helping the Americans to sort out the world's problems. They believe that the Americans are more likely to respect and consult an EU that is generally supportive. The French accept that the Europeans should sometimes partner the US. But they want a stronger EU so that it can stand up to the US and, when there is good reason, resist its hegemony. Most European governments have inclined to the British "Atlanticist" view. So do the Germans, normally, although the re-elected Schr? has veered between a special "German way" and support for France.
In recent months, the French strategy for dealing with the US has proved inept. In the old days, French prickliness may have sometimes produced the desired response from Washington. But not with this administration. De Villepin's intemperate attack on US policy on Iraq at the UN in January damaged Colin Powell and strengthened the hawks. Then France's extraordinary behaviour at Nato in February-leading Germany and Belgium into blocking Nato aid for the defence of Turkey-maddened even the most moderate Americans. Of course, the US has been provocative. But a senior figure in the administration told me last month that the rudeness of Rumsfeld and others was calculated: the French would overreact to such an extent that they would, in his words, "self-destruct." French leaders have fallen into a trap set by hawks who want France out of the alliance.
The British approach-to be publicly supportive of the US, in the hope that private conversations can influence its policy-has been, at least until recently, quite effective. Blair has clearly bent Bush's ear on a number of occasions. One year ago, he persuaded Bush to accept the new Nato-Russia council. Last September, he helped to push Bush down the UN route on Iraq and, in February, he convinced Bush to attempt a second UN resolution on Iraq. Blair sees how America is changing and worries about its unilateral tendencies. He believes that the best way for Europe to keep America on a multilateral track is to support it on the big questions of war and peace.
However, Blair's unflinching support for Bush has damaged his position in much of Europe. The further the US leans to the right, the harder it is for Britain to act as a bridge between Washington and continental Europe. Of course, the Spanish and Italian governments, and many in eastern Europe, back Blair's Atlanticist strategy. But public opinion does not. If Blair's attempt to keep the US working within a UN framework fails, that strategy becomes very difficult to sustain.
Europe needs a synthesis of the French and British approaches, around which "new" and "old" Europeans can rally. The EU should be generally supportive of the US, because they agree on many issues, and because few global problems can be solved without them working together. But European support should not be uncritical. And sometimes-when the EU has a strong interest in an issue and wants to shift US policy-that support should be conditional. French leaders will need to moderate the kind of Gaullist posturing that causes offence in Washington and much of eastern Europe. Equally, British leaders will have to be prepared to criticise the US when it acts against European interests. They need to show all their EU partners that they are prepared to work hard for common European foreign policies.
Meanwhile, if the Europeans can build a more coherent EU foreign and defence policy, the US will have a greater interest in listening to what they say. Given the rows over Iraq, you may regard that ambition as na?ly optimistic. But I believe that in the long run, the European governments will build a stronger external identity, not out of idealism, but because it is in their self-interest to do so. I do not believe that the "new" and "old" Europe fissure of recent months-provoked by the rudeness of Rumsfeld and Chirac, and too many declarations of two, eight, ten and so on-is permanent. The current and future EU members have much in common: not only in their economic interdependence and their social models, but also their foreign policies. They all take a view of the Israel-Palestine problem that is very different to that of the Washington hawks. We have common policies on Iran, the Balkans and even Russia. Iraq is the exception.
An enlarged EU need not turn into the kind of weak, free trade zone that you fear-so long as the convention on the future of Europe succeeds in making bold reforms to the EU's institutions. I am optimistic that some of the likely changes-such as scrapping the EU's rotating presidency, greater use of majority voting and the appointment of both a single EU foreign minister and a full-time president for the European council-will make Europe's foreign policy more effective. Of course, new institutions are no substitute for political will. But at some point the current rancour will subside, and the political will to build a stronger Europe will reappear. That European will is likely to be more effective if the right institutions are in place.
Best regards
Charles
Dear Charles
6th March 2003
My diagnosis is indeed much more sombre than yours. The US hawks are not only pushing France towards the alliance's exit door as you suggest-they are simply not interested in the alliance, full stop. If French diplomacy towards the US may not have been perfect, what is one to say of America's diplomacy towards the world? Only three (English-speaking) nations are significantly involved in the war against Iraq. This is a far cry from the 34-nation military coalition arrayed during the Gulf war, which included a strong military presence from Egypt, Syria and the Gulf monarchies. But whatever our differences in analysing the crisis, we both agree that it is worth trying to rescue the transatlantic relationship. The only problem is that the US, under its current administration, appears to be wholly uninterested in so doing. "The mission makes the coalition," and if we don't agree with the mission we are to be treated as outcasts.
Europe is the field in which Britain and France, and the other EU members, now have to make the really hard choices. The Iraq crisis has functioned as a catalyst: it has exposed the depth of the difference existing between the Europeans. We now know that plans for an effective common foreign and security policy and rapid reaction force are pipe dreams. Even if we have the military capabilities, we are simply not going to have the unified policies-at least, not in those cases where the Euro-peans have the slightest difference of view with the US. Washington has demonstrated ruthless efficiency in its willingness and ability to split Europe whenever some of the Europeans are not toeing the US line. For France, the choice is now binary. One option is to adopt a Eurosceptic posture, premised on the ability of the nation state to conduct an independent foreign and security policy, somewhat along the lines of pre-Suez British policy. This would not allow us to "box above our weight" but it would at least preserve our ability to judge on a case-by-case basis whether to join coalitions or not. This rather archaic approach would actually fit in quite well with the Bush administration's vision of international relations.
The other option is to look again at "Kern-Europa", the German idea of some ten years ago, whereby a small number of EU members-"core Europe"-decide to build their own union within the union: the euro and Schengen prefigure to some extent this choice, but here one would extend the idea to diplomacy and defence-merging the strategic military assets of the core countries. Whether this is possible depends on the readiness of the core countries to take the plunge, at a time of growing budget stringency and against the none too harmonious backdrop of traditional French attachment to national sovereignty and still-strong German pacifism. But it also depends on the French and the German ability to attract others, which implies the abandonment of the "we are the leaders of Europe" tone of the recent Franco-German revival. And lastly, it depends on our EU partners allowing us to get away with it, for it would be a terrible waste if "two-speed Europe" actually meant two Europes on divergent tracks, rather than a situation in which the core group remains open to those who are interested in a higher form of federalism. A new EU constitution with the sort of features you suggest-more majority voting, a full-time president of the council-has been effectively neutralised. After all, would Tony Blair or Jacques Chirac have accepted majority voting on the Iraq crisis? And if not, on what issue of importance would they accept it in the field of diplomacy and defence? And what would a permanent president of a 25-country European council do any better than Javier Solana has in the current crisis?
Yours
François
Dear François
7th March 2003
Of course, a better set of EU institutions would not have prevented the rifts over Iraq. But they might have limited the damage and then made it easier for the Europeans to pick up the pieces afterwards. You predict that the US will thwart the emergence of common European foreign policies, by calling on its allies to follow its lead. That has been the case over Iraq, but I doubt it will happen again. Europe's Atlanticist governments have burnt up huge amounts of political capital in following Bush on Iraq. In Britain, Blair has had to disregard the foreign office, his party, the mainstream media and public opinion. If in the future the US pursues another rogue state, demanding help from allies, the Europeans will deliver much less-even if Blair remains in power. Further episodes of American unilateralism and "Machtpolitik" are more likely to unite than divide the Europeans-unless continuing Franco-German condescension towards the new and smaller EU members pushes them back into the arms of the Americans.
I agree that France may pursue an independent, Eurosceptic policy, especially if it comes to believe that other countries are running the EU's external policy. The consequences would be disastrous: France is an awkward partner at the best of times, and if such a key country started to behave like de Gaulle's France in the 1960s, or Thatcher's Britain in the late 1980s, the EU would be disabled.
France's other choice, you say, is to build an inner core with the Germans. Every time that France starts to fret about EU enlargement or Britain's role in Europe, it revives the idea of a core that would exclude the British and east Europeans. I doubt that this is feasible. The EU's rules allow "reinforced co-operation" in certain areas, if the EU as a whole agrees, and we already have the euro group for countries in the single currency. But few EU members would be willing to join a new Franco-German led core, especially if the rationale was in part anti-American. Not only the east Europeans, but also many smaller west European states, in addition to Britain, Spain and Italy, would strongly oppose the creation of two classes of EU membership. Therefore France and Germany would have to build their "Kern- Europa" outside the legal framework of the EU, which would thereby be greatly damaged. I doubt that many German leaders would be prepared to take such a step. In any case, any defence core that excluded the British would be pretty meaningless.
France should not see Germany as its only viable partner. France remains in a state of denial about enlargement. If your leaders stopped insulting the east Europeans, they would discover that they are potential allies-the Poles, for example, will support you on farm subsidies. A former French prime minister recently told me that the EU should harmonise social and fiscal policies to prevent investment shifting to eastern Europe. When I explained that France would find it hard to win east European allies with such policies in the council of ministers, he was surprised-the thought had never crossed his mind.
On the big questions of foreign policy, France needs to think less about playing "cavalier seul", or about Franco-German leadership, and more about treating Britain as a third partner. If the big three could act as an informal leadership group, and hammer out a common line, the rest of the EU would be happy to follow. Of course, such concerted action would require a huge effort from Blair, Chirac and Schr?-an effort that they have not been willing to make in recent months.
Best regards
Charles
Dear Charles
8th March 2003
You are right about the damage-I would add the waste-which could be caused by establishing a "Kern- Europa" outside the legal framework of the EU: yet, apart from ill-advised Euroscepticism, what other option would there be for the French if the EU refuses to accept a two–tier approach to post-enlargement EU integration? It is worth remembering that in the field of defence, Britain successfully blocked any form of "coop?tion renforc?quot; in the Nice treaty. A core Europe with France and Germany would, indeed, not be ideal from a defence standpoint, and I would dearly like to see the Germans shape up in this respect: but again, what's the alternative?
What you say about the French-east European relationship-and indeed about French-German condescension-is difficult to dispute. There has been a tendency here to play it like Rumsfeld. However, when all is said and done, the new members are simply not interested in an ever closer union with a diplomatic and military dimension, since this may lead them into positions which could be different from those of the US. This tendency may pass in time, and it wouldn't hurt the French to extend the hand of friendship. In the meantime, with a politically meaningful European constitution having become impossible, the French are, yet again, "faute de mieux", left with either "souverainisme" or "Kern-Europa".
Alas, the Iraq crisis has pushed to the margins the very real need we have to operate as reasonably cohesive Atlantic allies and Europeans, in the face of the threat of mass destruction terrorism, combined with loose nukes from North Korea or Pakistan. These are the real dangers of the modern age. Unfortunately, I don't expect the quality of US leadership to improve or the level of US unilateralism to decrease: we were both at the Munich conference in February, and I will not soon forget the hubris-laden bullying with which members of the US delegation went at the "old Europeans." And unlike you, I don't expect the "new Europeans" to resist the next unilateral US initiative, in part because the pressure will be too strong, but also because some follow the US out of conviction.
Yours
François
Dear François
9th March 2003
You believe that the EU cannot forge effective foreign and defence policies with 25 members. But east Europeans do not have a very different worldview to west Europeans, except in their greater suspicion of Russia. Most east Europeans believe in the UN and oppose war in Iraq. The French treat Poland's decision to buy American F-16 fighters as "disloyal"-but the Hungarians and Czechs are buying British-Swedish Gripen aircraft. Most east Europeans do not want to choose between the US and Europe, but understand that membership of the EU entails some loyalty to it. One German ambassador told me-rather patronisingly-that after the letters of eight and ten in support of the US, "almost all the prime ministers who signed them telephoned Schr? to apologise."
You are right that any effective EU defence must allow militarily "serious" countries to operate on their own. The British government no longer opposes "coop?tion renforc?quot; for defence. In the midst of the Iraq crisis, Chirac and Blair managed to sign the Le Touquet declaration, setting out plans for running their aircraft carriers on a joint basis, and for a new EU agency to boost military capabilities. If France and Britain maintain such defence co-operation, Germany and the others will follow.
But any attempt to build EU foreign and defence policy in opposition to the US would divide Europe, prove hugely expensive (we would have to pay for the infrastructure that Nato and the US now provide) and damage transatlantic collaboration in other areas, such as trade and the fight against al Qaeda. Despite America's growing unilateralism, most of its values remain close to ours. The US needs our help to combat terror and proliferation, and to reconstruct Iraq, so it will learn to listen to our views. There will be times when we have to resist US policy. But our starting point should be one of co-operation.
Best regards
Charles
