Since the coalition forces entered Baghdad on 9th April, hopes for a quick transition to a free and stable Iraq have turned into a deepening pessimism about the country's future. The situation remains chaotic in some parts of the country, but the creation of an Iraqi governing council is a hopeful sign. Moreover, coalition and Iraqi administrators struggling to establish a democratic Iraq do have various political and historical factors on their side.
Democratic institutions are, after all, not alien to Iraq. Under the Hashemite monarchy (1921-58), Iraq adopted a parliamentary system modelled on Britain. Political parties existed from the early days of the monarchy, and some of these were vigorous opposition parties with mass followings. There were cases of electoral fraud and harassment of the opposition, but for long periods the political system allowed for a multiplicity of political opinions. Parliamentary debates were often vigorous and, on the whole, parliamentarians could argue and vote against the government without fear of retribution. While the palace and cabinet set the political agenda, parliament had some capacity to influence policy. This nascent pluralism was also evident in the press. Just prior to the 1958 revolution, 23 independent newspapers were published in Baghdad, Mosul and Basra alone. While the government occasionally banned a newspaper, these bans were typically quite brief.
This is not to deny the existence of authoritarianism, as well as tribal, ethnic and sectarian divisions, in Iraq's history. However, as in post-second world war Germany and Japan and in many post-communist transitions, democratic political institutions can over time, and sometimes quite quickly, soften these divisions. It is also true that democratic aspirations can be thwarted by self-interested elites or by exhausted populations who prefer a "strongman." In post-Saddam Iraq, the success of democracy will depend on whether new constitutional and political arrangements can be put in place before the occupation's social capital is spent and whether such arrangements can adapt to the country's unique social and communal imperatives. What should these institutions and arrangements look like?
Secularism Since the founding of the modern Iraqi state in 1921, secularism has been a mainstay of the political system. During the monarchical period, clerical figures sat in parliament, particularly in the upper house. But their participation in debates occurred within the parameters of the secular constitution. Indeed, rarely have Shi'i and Sunni clerics advocated the intrusion of religious doctrine into the political sphere, let alone the institution of an Islamic state in Iraq. Following the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979 an underground Shi'i movement called al-Da'wa, led by the charismatic imam Muhammad Baqr al-Sadr, did advocate an Iraqi Islamic state, but with the suppression of the movement and the execution of its leader, the idea simply petered out.
Exploiting the current confusion, and buoyed by their ability to provide security and services for their own people, some young Shi'i clergy, particularly in Baghdad's Shi'i slum al-Sadr district (formerly Saddam City), have called for the institution of an Islamic state. They have also used the Friday prayers to incite people to demonstrate in the streets, waving banners and shouting anti-secular slogans.
These radical Shi'i clerics have tried to legitimise their stance by reference to the Najaf Hawza, the circle of senior clerics in the holy city of Najaf. However, Najaf has not endorsed such a radical message. The most senior cleric, Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, has repeatedly advocated peaceful transition to a civilian and representative government. And the other senior cleric, Muhammad Baqr al-Hakim, who heads the Iranian-trained Badr Brigade, has pledged his commitment to a pluralist and democratic society. Even Najaf's young firebrand Muqtada al-Sadr has backed a broad, representative government. Likewise, the most respected Sunni cleric, Sheikh Ahmad al-Kubaisi, dismissed the idea of an Islamic government, advocating democracy instead. Indeed, at a meeting in Amman, Jordan, in late May, senior representatives of the Shi'i, Sunni and Christian communities called for a democratically-elected government.
The clerics know that an Islamic government in Iraq is an invitation to sectarian violence, even civil war, since such a government would have to base its laws on either the Sunni or the Shi'i codes. While the Shi'i are the majority, about 35 per cent of Iraqis are Sunnis. The frictions between the groups mean that a secular constitution is supported by almost all sides.
Federalism Iraq's ethnic and sectarian diversity is often seen as an impediment to stability and democracy. In the early weeks of the occupation, communal violence between Arabs and Kurds surfaced in the northern cities of Kirkuk and Mosul. But after multi-ethnic councils were elected, quiet and a semblance of normality has returned to these cities. The interest of each community in checking the power of the other is likely, over the long term, to promote democracy at the expense of communal particularism. For that reason, democratic Iraq must have a federal system of government. The Kurds have fought for, and received, differing degrees of autonomy since Ottoman times, and have enjoyed freedom from central authority since the start of the northern no-fly zone in 1991. But all Iraqis would benefit from federalism. So what kind is required?
First, both centre and regions should be equal guardians of the constitution. Keeping both in their assigned constitutional space is the responsibility of a strong federal judiciary, with constitutional amendments passed only with the concurrence of both houses of the legislature, the head of state and all federal units. Allowing the centre to bypass the regions in amending the constitution increases regional antipathy to central control, as occurred for example in Russia before the December 1993 referendum imposed a new federal constitution.
Second, both centre and periphery should have the power to raise and distribute revenues. Power follows resources, and if the centre denies regions the right to raise and spend revenue, it is tantamount to denying them power. Revenue-sharing between the centre and regions also decreases the temptation for one ethnic group to either capture the state or seek separation. However, when it comes to Iraq's oil, control must continue to reside with the centre.
Third, regional governments should have responsibility for all citizens in their areas, not just ethnic co-nationals. The now-collapsed Israeli scheme of giving the Palestinian Authority control over Arab activity in the West Bank and Gaza, while themselves supporting Jews in these two areas was doomed, since modern states, with their massive infrastructures, can only function territorially. Limiting authorities to caring for "their own" reinforces tribal, ethnic, and religious sectarianism, which undermines democracy. For these reasons, any temptation on the part of Iraq's Arab elites once again to grant the Kurds autonomy over their own people in the north but without substantial control over territory would most likely repeat previous failures. Creating territorially-based federal units encourages attachment to the state in a way that allows the central institutions to stand for all citizens, and local institutions to reflect the cultural diversity of the different groups.
So how is it possible to increase the chances that federalism will work? In general, the occupying authorities should avoid building institutions based on ethnic and sectarian representatives. Although it has helped to stem ethnic violence in some areas, the practice of allocating seats in local councils in places like Kirkuk according to ethnic quotas is a bad policy if translated to a national level, since it excludes other identities (gender, professional and so on) and reinforces ethnicity as the determinant of a person's qualification for office.
For the same reason, the occupying authorities should guard against creating only three federal units based on ethnic or sectarian exclusivity: a Kurdish north, a Shi'i south and a Sunni centre. It is more sensible to keep the present administrative division of Iraq into 18 units, which would serve the interests of the various communities, while avoiding inordinate emphasis on ethnic and sectarian concerns and increasing competition for resources even among the federal units within each community.
Each of the 18 units would elect a local government and send representatives to an upper chamber of a new parliament. An upper chamber based on regions, as in Germany, has the advantage of bringing regional concerns to the centre. Such a system checks central power, and by providing a second set of local elites, minimises regional corruption. These provisions are in contrast to the old prefect system in France or those newly adopted in Russia of allowing for the appointment of governors. Appointing governors only accelerates centralisation and is open to enormous abuse if there is not a very entrenched commitment to the law in the executive branch. So far the occupying authority has avoided appointing even temporary Iraqi governors, and has shown itself willing to replace mayors and local councils (as in Najaf and Basra) which appear to be corrupt, nepotistic or loyal to Saddam-a wise move since it would be difficult to displace them when the occupation ends.
The executive branch This is usually structured in one of two ways: it can be unified in a single, strong presidency combining the powers of the head of state and the head of government, or it can be divided, separating the functions of the head of state from the head of government. What are the advantages and disadvantages of each for Iraq?
In strong presidential systems, presidents are normally directly elected, enjoy wide latitude in ruling by executive order, can call referendums that override legislative authority, unilaterally declare states of emergency and usually have broad powers in administrative, and judicial appointments. When they are perceived as effective their rule can be popular-Charles de Gaulle in the first years of the Fifth Republic or Boris Yeltsin before 1993.
The disadvantages of a strong presidency, however, outweigh the advantages. In all but the strongest democracies, the system is open to abuse by the president and to capture through coups by opposition forces. Among the unitary presidents in the middle east and the post-communist world, cases of corruption and self-aggrandisement are legion. Getting strong presidents to leave office is difficult: they usually cling to power either in violation of the constitution, or by amending it in undemocratic ways.
It is this strong presidential model, steeped in authoritarianism, that dominates Arab politics. Of the 12 Arab presidencies, only Lebanon currently has a president who plays by democratic rules. Indeed, Arab presidents increasingly are not content just to stay in office indefinitely, but usually groom their sons as successors. In Arab capitals today, one hears Arab presidential systems described as "monarchical republics." This tendency to authoritarianism is also characteristic of strong presidencies in the post-communist world, where those countries most distant from democratic practices are the states that have adopted strong presidential models.
An alternative which might take account of Iraq's division into Shi'i, Kurds and Sunnis is Bosnia's shared presidency model, in which each ethnic community receives a seat on a presidential triumvirate. Agreed as part of the US-brokered Dayton accords, such an arrangement was the price that had to be paid for ending the conflict. But it has been beset by problems and has meant almost no state-building. Each of the three presidents is elected only by, and responsible only to, their respective ethnic communities. This allows for and reinforces the tendency for rival substate authorities to establish and maintain fiefdoms within Bosnia, and the leaders have had no incentive to co-operate with each other. The Serb stronghold in particular has acted as a vassal for manipulation by ultra-nationalists in Belgrade. In Iraq, given the Shi'i affinity with their co-religionists in Iran, and the Kurds' ethnic connection with Turkish and Iranian Kurds, the use of a Dayton-style presidency would be particularly dangerous.
A weak but unitary presidency would avoid the Bosnia scenario and the problem of creeping authoritarianism. In weak presidential systems, such as in Germany, Italy, Israel, Hungary and the Czech Republic, the president is typically chosen by parliament, and has limited powers such as recommending judges and approving constitutional amendments. In such systems, presidents cannot initiate constitutional changes, unilaterally call referendums, or prorogue parliament, but they do serve as guardians of the constitution against rogue parliaments.
Splitting the executive into a head of state and head of government should have more success in sustaining democracy in Iraq. This division would allow for political duelling to take place under the democratic tent and not in the Iraqi street. A prime minister chosen by, and dependent upon maintaining, the majority in the lower house of a bicameral parliament is a buttress against presidential abuse. The president on the other hand should be chosen by the upper house-by representatives of the 18 federal units as well as notables and professionals-where he would be perceived as the symbolic father of the Iraqi nation, while the prime minister would keep the affairs of the state running.
Restoring the Hashemite monarchy, under strict constitutional limits, could have real advantages. The Hashemites share the faith of the Sunni minority, which will reassure the Sunnis that the inevitable change in the balance of power need not mean their marginalisation. A further advantage is the monarchy's connection with tradition, which would make it a stabilising force during a time of uncertainty and a barrier against extremism. A constitutional monarchy could become the symbol of Iraq's unity and its civility, and the custodian of its traditional values.
In the light of the threat republican Iraq has been to its southern neighbours, a monarchy-legitimated by a popular referendum-would be reassuring to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, and would be welcomed by Jordan. Some argue that monarchies are a thing of the past. Yet in 1975, after almost 40 years of General Franco's authoritarianism, a constitutional monarchy was restored in Spain and helped to move the country forward. And in the Arab world today it is not the presidencies but the monarchies in Morocco, Bahrain, Qatar, Jordan and Kuwait that are leading the way to limited democratic reforms.
In conclusion, an executive split between a head of state (president or constitutional monarch) and a head of government would be best for Iraq. This system is less prone to abuse of power, less likely to slide into authoritarianism, less likely to be overthrown by the military and more open to error correction.
Elections and electoral systems If Iraq opts for a presidential system, with a split executive, should the president be chosen by direct or indirect elections? There are advantages to both: a direct election in which the entire population votes for the president theoretically encourages rival candidates to position themselves at the centre of political debate in order to maximise the chance of winning, but it can also favour populist and anti-democratic candidates. Because of this fear, presidents in several new central European democracies are chosen by parliament.
In Iraq, where some 55-60 per cent of the population is Shi'i, direct election could be expected to shift the political balance from Sunnis to the Shi'i-possibly bringing to power Shi'i elites who promise maximum resources for their own region, or an increased role for religion in state affairs. Indirect elections, in which the president is chosen by the upper house, and thus beholden to another democratically-chosen body, provide a further barrier against tyranny.
Prime ministers generally are leaders of the parliamentary majority in the lower house. The president and prime minister thus have different power bases and can be representatives of different parties. During such periods of cohabitation, gridlock increases, but so does the need for consensus politics. In countries where dire economic conditions increase the need for strong and decisive government, one would hesitate to recommend such a system; but Iraq's major problem is not economic hardship but rather the concentration of great wealth in one industry that is located primarily in the Shi'i south. Persuading elites to shepherd this resource for the common wealth is the challenge, and institutions that diffuse power will probably work best.
The two key issues for parliamentary elections are how to draw the boundaries of the electoral districts and how many members should be elected from each. During the monarchical period, Iraq was divided into 14 provinces, each subdivided into electoral districts of 20,000 voters. These were single-member districts, in which tribal leaders often predominated. Iraq is far more urbanised now and it seems best to draw electoral boundaries that give weighted influence to urban dwellers. This will also advantage secularist tendencies and decrease the possibility of tribal domination of the lower house.
The second issue is whether to have multi-member or single-member districts. In Iraq's case, there are several advantages to multi-member districts (MMDs). They allow a district's diversity to be mirrored in parliament. In Iraq, MMDs should increase the representation of the middle class as well as local minorities, including Sunnis in Basra, Christians in Baghdad, Turkmen and Assyrians in Kirkuk, Arabs in Kurdish areas and Kurds in Arab areas. Also, studies have shown that MMDs in excess of five per district boost the representation of women.
The acquiescence of coalition forces in the virtual exclusion of women from the first two large-scale meetings of Iraqi political forces held in the country after the war ended is troubling and short-sighted. With the high levels of education and professional attainment of women in Iraq, their input would contribute considerably to democratic stability. This is especially urgent now that we see increasing clerical demands for curtailing women's rights and freedoms in a country where women have traditionally enjoyed more freedom than elsewhere in the Arab world.
Another way to ensure representation of women and minorities is to provide set-aside seats. Iraq's pre-1958 monarchical constitution guaranteed Christians and Jews seats in parliament. In general, however, recent examples of set-aside seats show that they cement rather than eradicate ethnic divisions. Set-aside seats for diaspora Croats in Franjo Tudjman's Croatia reinforced ultra-nationalism within the ruling party. MMDs are preferable as the means to maximise representation of women and minorities while still obliging all parties and candidates to appeal to as wide an electorate as possible.
In Iraq it would also be preferable to have a mixed voting system with half the seats being chosen by elections in multi-member districts as described above and half chosen by party-list proportional representation (PR). Voters would have two ballots at each election, one for district representatives and another for nationwide parties. The advantage of a mixed system-as in Germany, Russia, Japan, Italy and elsewhere-is that it allows voters to have direct contact with their local representatives while at the same time encouraging the development of nationwide parties whose programmes are national rather than regional or sectarian. In this way, small regional parties might win individual seats in MMD elections, but would probably be shut out of the PR portion of the election. In Iraq, such provisions should weaken ethnic and sectarian-based parties. For example, unless they joined others in forming a national party, Kurdish representation in the lower house would be limited to seats won in their local districts.
Most states have upper houses with narrower powers than the lower chamber. Until 1958, Iraq had an upper house appointed by the king. There are two advantages to an upper house. First, it could be the forum where federal units, taking about half the seats, have direct representation in national government. Second, it could act as a broad council representing both Iraq's tribal past and its self-identity as a modern state. Therefore, the remaining half of the upper house seats could be filled by, on the one hand, tribal and regional notables and, on the other hand, representatives of professional associations. This would help to stimulate the re-emergence of independent associational life so vital for democracy.
There is also the issue of whether certain groups who have undermined democracy should be banned from politics-specifically the clergy, the military, and the Ba'ath party. The clergy should be allowed to enter the upper house as representatives of their communities (Muslim and Christian) provided they accept the secular character of the constitution-complete exclusion of the clergy has usually had disastrous consequences in the middle east. Military officers should also be able to enter politics if retired from active service, thereby upholding the principle of civilian control over the military. As for the Ba'ath party, its recent banning is to be applauded as it contributes to the creation of a public memory of Ba'athist responsibility for tyranny. Officials who participated in torture and other human rights violations should be prosecuted and banned from future participation in public life. The many middle-level careerists in the party should be allowed to participate in political life but only as members of new parties. Banning the party avoids the mistake made in some post-Soviet states where reformed communist parties were allowed to keep existing assets, thereby upsetting the level playing field necessary for the emergence of a competitive party system.
Middle class and bureaucracy A developed middle class is essential to an effective and sustainable democracy. Even after 12 years of sanctions, there still exists a substantial and educated middle class. However, it has not been at the forefront of demands for democratisation. One reason for this is that the middle class was terrorised by Saddam's regime into submission. But there is a broader reason too.
Looking back at the second half of the 19th century, one is struck by the contrast in the democratic experiences of Britain and Germany. Democracy was rapidly being incorporated into British politics through a series of parliamentary acts that not only expanded the electorate, but also placed ever increasing limitations on the power of the monarchy and aristocracy. In Germany's Second Reich, however, political elites dominated by the nobility ruled through a strong authoritarian regime in which the chancellors and their cabinets were not answerable to the Reichstag. It is no coincidence that Britain's progress toward democracy was spurred by an entrepreneurial middle class largely independent of the state. In Germany the economy was linked to the state, and industrialisation was driven by an alliance between the state and the traditional elites. The lack of an independent middle class was a major reason for the authoritarianism of the Second Reich.
Iraq too suffers from this democratic deficit. Along with most other Arab countries, much of Iraq's middle class has been directly dependent on the state, primarily through employment in the bureaucracy, in state-owned industries and military and security agencies. Moreover, government revenue has come mainly from oil sales rather than taxation, removing a potential cause of middle-class discontent. In fact, the problem goes deeper, for even the private sector has shown little inclination to promote democracy. As long as companies were allowed, indeed aided, by the authoritarian state to make money, they were content to leave politics alone.
A primary goal, therefore, should be the swift transfer of resources from the public to the private sector in order to stimulate entrepreneurship and strengthen the free market. This should have a big political payoff by developing a self-sustaining middle class which will become more proactive in promoting democracy. Moreover, a proper tax system should gradually be introduced, for only then will the middle class demand accountability from the state.
Inefficiency and corruption will also diminish if entry into a streamlined bureaucracy is based on merit alone without regard for sect, ethnicity or political affiliation. In Saddam's Iraq, unqualified yet loyal personnel were given posts of high responsibility over more able subordinates. But the culture of merit is in fact embedded in Iraqi consciousness. The most visible example of this is the national baccalaureate exam, which for decades has been taken at the end of high school. It has been the great equaliser, where children of humble origins who achieved high scores in the exam would receive a free education in the country's best colleges, or be sent abroad.
Restructuring Iraq's political system may be laden with difficulties, but it is certainly feasible. Crucial to success is the construction of a democracy sensitive to the unique features of Iraqi society. Once the system is in place, its benefits will quickly become evident to the various communities, and if accompanied by economic prosperity (hardly a pipe dream given the country's wealth), it will gradually, yet surely, acquire legitimacy. A democratic federal system would turn Iraq into the standard against which other Arab governments are judged, as well as making it a natural, and not a forced, ally of the west. Such an outcome would benefit everyone-but especially the Iraqi people, whose suffering continues in Iraq's current chaos.
