Science against philosophy
Dear Anthony,
I will not spare your convictions-this century you philosophers have contributed nothing to the understanding of science. Certainly nothing that is of slightest relevance to practising scientists such as myself.
This is a great pity as science is the foremost achievement of our culture. It is the best way to understand the world. But it involves ideas that are "unnatural" in that they do not conform with common sense. Just consider the Earth going round the Sun or the big bang. I looked to the philosophers of science for illumination as to what, for example, is meant by a scientific understanding and why science works. Alas, I found nothing but obscurity and lack of interest. They seem to be interested in philosophy, not science. I would like help with problems such as the nature and limits of reductionism (according to which scientific explanation proceeds by reference to ever more basic entities, such as DNA in the case of genes) and how to distinguish science from non-science. But philosophers of science seem to be much more interested in problems related to realism: is there a real world out there that we scientists study? How boring. I am a crass and na?, even militant, realist, which I know I could not defend philosophically, but for my science it is totally irrelevant. Practising scientists have no interest in the philosophy of science and, in Gerald Holton's phrase, view philosophy as a "debilitating befuddlement."
But things are worse than that. One apparently widely held position in the philosophy of science is the underdetermination of theories. This states that any given body of data will always be compatible with a number of mutually incompatible theories. The usual explanation for this-what seems to me an absurd proposition-is that it is in principle possible, given a set of points on a graph, to draw an infinite number of curves through them. How trivial! When I challenge the philosophers to provide me with just one other explanation for how genes code for proteins, or the composition of water, or the circulation of the blood, they become uncharacteristically silent or claim that I just do not understand.
I have heard defenders of the philosophy of science claim that its practitioners have actually made some contribution to science. If philosophers have made any contribution to science then it is as scientists, not as philosophers. The test is whether in order to understand their contribution one needs to have any knowledge or understanding of philosophy. To understand, for example, any contribution by philosophers to debates on consciousness requires no prior know-ledge of philosophy.
I often have to deal with the claim that Karl Popper is an exception to the failure of philosophers to help scientists. After all did not the Nobel laureates Peter Medawar and John Eccles say that he had a significant influence on their work? My own view is that he is greatly overrated because he is the only philosopher that scientists understand. His emphasis on falsification totally discounts discovery and fails to avoid the problem of induction, whereby we proceed to infer the general from the particular without apparent justification. Popper's falsification theory is certainly not the way scientists work and I think that it has damaged the social sciences and given support to what I really detest, relativism. Relativists say that science is just another set of myths, a social construct with no particular validity. Thomas Kuhn has to bear some of the blame, too, as his interesting ideas about paradigms do not imply incompatibility between the old and the new theories. Quite the contrary, the old is incorporated into the new.
But I doubt if you would wish to defend Popper. It always amuses me what a low standing he has among philosophers. I am however interested to know how you regard feminist philosophy of science which I see in the Oxford Companion to Philosophy described as a "particularly significant contribution to the body of sceptical literature which asks whether conventional scientific methods and methodology are as successful at tracking or converging on truth and validity as they have claimed to be." No justification is offered, and if philosophers believe that, then the gap between us seems unbridgeable.
Kindest regards,
Lewis
4th January 1997
Dear Lewis,
No gap is unbridgeable. Most of what you say rests solely on a refusal to call anything "philosophy" unless you vehemently disagree with it. It is easy to prove anything you want if you concoct your own definitions in this way. You execute the tactic with such brio that I think it should henceforth be known as "doing a Wolpert." It can, however, be countered.
You claim that if philosophers of science have made any contribution to science, then it is "as scientists... not as philosophers." I think that the border between the two subjects is vague, so I don't much mind how you classify the people who work there. But what you say about it is revealingly self-contradictory. You hold that if it is possible to understand a piece of work without having any training in philosophy, then it cannot be philosophy. Yet you have no training in philosophy. It follows, by your lights, that you do not understand a word of it. So how come you have so much to say about it?
Actually, of course, you do understand a fair bit of the philosophy of science. You have even contributed to it yourself in The Unnatural Nature of Science, particularly in your arguments against falsificationism and against relativism. If that is not philosophy, I don't know what is. Now: do you really think that you have said the last word on all the topics you discussed? You may not want to hear any more about them, but I think it is eccentric to condemn everyone who discusses them in more detail than you have done.
In fact it is more than eccentric. You are cutting off your nose to spite your face. Let us consider your old bugbear, relativism. You say you cannot "philosophically" defend your own opposing position of realism. But don't you even want to? The majority of philosophers defend the same position as you, and it is not inconceivable that some of them have done it better. How come realism is worth elaborating only when it is you who are doing it?
Now for the harm which you claim that philosophy of science has done in this century. I presume that what you have in mind is the succour that the work of Paul Feyerabend and Thomas Kuhn has given to the anti-science movement. Now I think that the significance of this movement, if it is a movement, is grossly exaggerated and that the people who believe their sort of stuff harm nothing except their own intellects. But here is a curious thing. If you think that relativist philosophers should bear some blame for hostility to science, why do you not also think that the greater number of philosophers who oppose relativism deserve some credit for helping to undermine this hostility? Popular accounts of philosophy understandably highlight the more outrageous fringes of the subject. I am surprised that a learned man takes such journalistic hyperbole at face value. It is rather like taking Rupert Sheldrake as a paradigm example of a scientist.
I am sorry that you have been disappointed by contemporary philosophers of science. But the idea that they are only concerned with whether or not the world exists, or are all relativists (feminist or otherwise), or are not really interested in science is so blatantly false that your efforts to understand them have plainly not been in earnest. What you say about the underdetermination of theories underlines this. You have tried to squeeze a very advanced topic into a tiny nutshell, and unsurprisingly have failed. If you must have a one sentence encapsulation, I would offer this: the evaluation of theories is not just a matter of totting up data. Trivial? Perhaps. But who expects much nourishment from a nutshell?
I think you are only in the market for instant gratification, and I agree that you will not get this from philosophy. The sort of rigorous argument which goes by the name of philosophy does not come easily to anyone. Your great theme is the unnatural nature of science. How ironic that you cannot appreciate the unnatural nature of philosophy.
Best wishes,
Anthony
6th January 1997
Dear Anthony,
Your response reminds me of the dog that did not bark; you completely avoid dealing with the central issues that I raised.
I am delighted that most philosophers are realists but that is not the same as saying that they are not relativists when it comes to science. Realism, in any case, is an uninteresting problem for scientists. I am also delighted that many philosophers like science; my complaint stems from my disappointment that they have so little to offer us.
It simply will not do for you to argue that my admission that I know no philosophy provides an explanation for my lack of enthusiasm for the philosophy of science. If there were but the slightest hint that you or they had something to offer me then I would gladly try to learn. So why not try and offer some little titbit that would tempt me? Just one idea in the whole field that you think is important.
It will not do to fob me off when I ask about underdetermination. To say that this is just too advanced for me is patronising. Your statement that theories are not just a matter of totting up data is indeed trivial. It is so obvious to any scientist that I do not believe that you wish me to take it seriously. Why not open the "nutshell" and see if you can make it larger? I do not expect instant gratification, just a glimmer of illumination. One favour-please do not call me a philosopher; if anything, I like to think of myself as doing, on occasion, the natural history of science. But philosophy of science-never.
Regards,
Lewis
8th January 1997
Dear Lewis,
I did not avoid dealing with the issue between us: I tried to clarify it. The misrepresentations in your second letter confirm my belief that this is what is most needed.
I did not say that the issue of underdetermination is too advanced for you; I said that you have not earnestly tried to understand it. Nor did I argue that your lack of enthusiasm for the philosophy of science is due to your lack of knowledge of the subject. On the contrary, I pointed out that you have contributed to it, although you are curiously unwilling to acknowledge this.
We are at cross-purposes when you reply to me that "most philosophers are realists but that is not the same as saying that they are not relativists when it comes to science." There are several senses of the term "realist" used by philosophers. One of them is "anti-relativist," and that is what I meant. The overwhelming majority of philosophers of science are not relativists; the majority of student texts argue against relativism, as you do, not for it. If that failed to come across in my first letter, I hope it is clear enough now.
Now for your challenge-which, I must say, strongly reminds me of John Cleese's insistent: "But what have the Romans ever done for us?", in Monty Python's Life of Brian. The two topics you mention in your first letter (the limits of reductionism, and the demarcation between science and non-science) are good places to start. I certainly think I understand these topics better after reading the wide variety of opinions that have been expressed on them. What more can one ask for? Of course, no scientist needs to indulge his philosophical curiosity in order to further his everyday work as a scientist. But which philosopher has ever claimed otherwise? The philosophers are not trying to steal your patch, you know.
What philosophers of science try to offer (it is worth remembering that at least half of the best-known ones this century were trained as scientists or mathematicians) is intellectual illumination that goes beyond what you need for everyday work. The outstanding example of a modern scientist who had plenty of time for this is Einstein, who repeatedly wrote of his indebtedness to philosophers. You will find the relevant references in the essays of Gerald Holton, whom you quoted in your first letter-without stating that the quote did not reflect his own view. A more recent example is Steven Weinberg, the joint author of the "standard model" of particle physics. Recently, in the New York Review of Books, Wein-berg gave a sample list of seven 20th century philosophers whose work he had found "illuminating." Perhaps you will say that Einstein and Weinberg do not count as real scientists?
Speaking of dogs that didn't bark: you weren't, by any chance, bitten by a philosopher when you were a child?
All the best,
Anthony
9th January 1997
Dear Anthony,
Quite a nice set of bites but still no bark. You offer me nothing other than your own enlightenment that came from reading some unnamed philosophers on reductionism. Lucky you; if only I could find them saying anything of the slightest relevance. And I have tried to understand what the claims for underdetermination are about, and my understanding has led me to the conclusion that they are either wrong or trivial.
It is with some amusement that I see you have chosen Steven Weinberg, a distinguished physicist, to support your claim that philosophy is of value to scientists. I am tempted to say that this is just what I might expect from a philosopher-a total neglect of the real world. In his recent book, Dreams of a Final Theory, Weinberg has a whole chapter entitled "Against Philosophy." He describes himself as "an unregenerate working scientist who finds no help in professional philosophy," and continues "I am not alone in this; I know of no one who has participated actively in the advance of physics in the postwar period whose work has been significantly helped by philosophers."
And as to Einstein, he was really dealing with the philosophy of the last century and I have never claimed that philosophy has never helped science. After all, Aristotle was a philosopher. But, again in the Weinberg chapter there is a report by Heisenberg that Einstein in 1926 contemptuously referred to philosophy as nonsense.
I know your aim is not to help us, and remain mystified by what it in fact is. Medawar said that science is the art of the soluble. Could it be that philosophy is the art of the insoluble? It is hardly a field that can claim any progress this century. Philosophers are clever and the discussions can be fun and stimulating, like a lovely intellectual game, but no more than that.
To repeat; I am in no way against the philosophers of science, only very disappointed. I was never bitten by a philosopher as a child nor ever even frightened by one; your resort to psychobabble might be taken to reflect the weakness of your case. I, for my part, am always willing to change my mind but I do need some evidence. That is at the heart of science.
Regards
Lewis
11th January 1997
Dear Lewis,
I know Weinberg's chapter "Against Philosophy"-better than you do, it seems. You do not mention that he admits, in a footnote, that its title is an exaggeration and that he chose it because it is catchy. It was partly in order to counter the chapter's misleading implications that he made the more considered remark which I quoted.
I am sorry to have to dispel your amusement at my citing him as an example of a scientist who found contemporary philosophy of science to be illuminating. But that is exactly what he says. The fact that he also says that the subject is unnecessary for his everyday work is irrelevant: of course it is. I do not know why you, and he, think this is worth mentioning when nobody denies it. As for Einstein, your quotation about him from Heisenberg is simply wrong. Read the passage again: Einstein called positivism nonsense, as do most current philosophers.
Come to think of it, I do know why you make a song and dance about philosophy of science not helping you with your work, and curiously think that this amounts to a shortcoming of philosophy. It is because you cannot see the point of an intellectual activity that does not yield concrete results which can be announced in Nature. The progress of philosophy is hard to discern except at a considerable historical distance. Is it not perhaps worth reflecting on the fact that you, like many others, are prepared to allow value to philosophy only when it is very old?
About your request for further evidence (that is, examples) of worthwhile philosophy of science: since the subject deals in analyses, elucidations and arguments, not theorems or discoveries, I do not see what I can do in the space available except to offer reading lists. But I judged that this would not be useful. I remember lending you two books I liked. One you said was too technical. The other (which was non-technical) was returned, after many months, unread.
The reason why I think it is worth contesting the visceral hostility to philosophy that is evident in your letters ("just what I might expect from a philosopher-a total neglect of the real world") is that it ill serves a cause we both believe in. We share the view that scientific knowledge ought to be more effectively promoted to the general public. Now, one thing which makes many people wary of science is that they think that scientists are too narrowly focused on their work and insufficiently reflective about its impact, meaning and intellectual context. I am not saying I believe this. But don't you think that your remarks about philo-sophy give the enemy some pretty potent ammunition?
All the best,
Anthony
