Schäuble: waiting for power?

Wolfgang Schäuble, 52, was one of the central strategists of German unity. Despite being paralysed from the chest downwards following an assassination attempt, he is also Helmut Kohl's chosen successor if the Chancellor should decide not to stand again in 1998. Having negotiated German unification in 1989, he has turned his attention to an even more contentious unification project as one of the Christian Democrats' leading thinkers on Europe. Domestically he is regarded as a nationalist with forthright views on the consequences of Germany's restored sovereignty. In this he represents a generational shift in relation to Kohl. His nationalism, however, appears to co-exist quite happily with the quasi-federalist attitude to Europe of his Chancellor, and he was one of the authors of the CDU paper advocating that a "magnetic" core of European countries should drive European integration onwards.

As Helmut Kohl has assumed a more presidential style since unification, the sharp-tongued Schäuble has taken on the role of driving forward the party agenda in the Bundestag. The two men have enjoyed a close personal and political friendship. As head of the Chancellor's office from 1984-1989, and later interior minister, Schäuble was responsible for formulating inter-German policy during the terminal phase of east Germany and through unification itself. His high profile during unification proved personally fateful. On October 12th 1990, nine days after his work on the technicalities of the merger, he was gunned down by a deranged assailant at a public meeting. He spoke to Anne McElvoy in his Bonn offices, on the fifth anniversary of the attack. When the allotted time was up, his powerful shoulders swung into action and he wheeled his way on to his next appointment. Wheelchair-bound or not, Wolfgang Schäuble maintains an essential skill in politics: the ability to leave a room at top speed; vigorously, but smoothly.



Q You recently wrote that Germany, five years after unification, was characterised by a "balance between euphoria and depression." What causes feelings of euphoria or depression in you when you reflect on your country?

A By euphoria, I mean the joy over achieving sovereignty and unification. By depression, I was referring to the strains inherent in the task of evening out deep divisions, re-enforced by 45 years of dictatorship in east Germany and free-market democracy in west Germany. The east Germans are in two minds: if they compare their situation with five years ago, it is substantially better, but if they compare it with that of people in west Germany, it is worse. It is instructive to go back over the time-span before drawing conclusions. 1988-90 was a period of great excitement. By 1992, the disappointments outweighed the joys. I would summarise our situation by saying that we have not come as far as we thought we would in 1990. But we have come a lot further than we thought we would come in 1992.

Q The project of political and currency union in Europe has run into substantial difficulties. You were one of the authors of the controversial "core paper" which first suggested that a small group of countries should move ahead if other member states were unwilling or unable to match the pace set by the Maastricht treaty. Do you accept the critics' fears that such a strategy would only be possible at the price of holding back the entry of eastern European countries?

A "Core Europe" was never intended to suggest that a deepening of the EU would be at the expense of widening it. On the contrary, if we want to achieve both a widening and a deepening of the EU, we have to accept that not all countries will be ready for the same degree of integration in the transitional period. Those who will and can complete the first step towards integration by 1999 should do so. This is sometimes misunderstood as an intention to freeze out other countries. But the "core" was not intended to be exclusive-it was to act as a magnet, drawing others in. Secondly, what I and others proposed was not different from what was envisaged under the terms of the Maastricht treaty. No one realistically expected that all the member states would manage currency union at once. It will begin with a small group and others will join later. Our main point of difference in Germany with some countries, such as Britain, is that we reject the idea of variable geometry. Our aim remains the same degree of integration for all, albeit at different speeds, reflecting individual economic conditions.

Q You have stressed that a currency union would be unthinkable without the participation of France. That leaves a question mark over the necessity of participation of other countries-such as the UK.

A The paradox here is that Britain is very likely to fulfil the qualification criteria by the date laid down in the Maastricht treaty. The question we all want to see answered as soon as possible is: does Britain want to take part or not? In France, the will to take part is not in question. We have every reason to believe that President Chirac and a majority in government are serious about this and we have no right to doubt their ability to achieve this. At the moment, only Germany and Luxembourg fulfil the criteria set out in the treaty. A currency union between Germany and Luxembourg would not be the beginning of a common European currency. That would demand the participation of a number of European countries, or it won't happen at all-or at least not yet. I cannot imagine beginning without France. If Britain wanted to, I could not imagine starting without Britain either. By 1999, the Austrians and the Dutch will be ready. The Belgians will have to exert themselves in reducing their state debt, but that could be done with a tight privatisation programme. If we have six or seven countries ready and able to participate by 1999, I can see no reason not to start then. Our wish is that Britain will take part.

Q Do you share Finance Minister Theo Waigel's view that Italy is unlikely to satisfy the economic criteria for currency Union by 1999? If so, do you have any sympathy with the Italians' plea that monetary union should be delayed to enable countries struggling with the criteria to complete the alignment of their economies?

A To deal with the second question first, I would rule out any softening of the criteria. There is no debate about that in Germany. I agree with Herr Waigel's comments that it will be difficult for the Italians to make it by 1999. The Italian prime minister himself has said this, so I found it difficult to comprehend the fuss over Waigel's remarks.

If we were to soften the qualification criteria for EMU, we would undermine from the start trust in the stability of the European currency. That would lead to a catastrophic reaction in the world markets, which would do great damage to the new currency. The worries that people have about the pressures on the European currency in the first few years can only be assuaged if we are sure that it will be stable. If it is, the centrifugal tendencies, which will undoubtedly be present in the early phases, can be kept in check. If not, if the international markets do not quickly establish faith in this currency, it could fail. That would be worse than it not having started at all.

Q The suspicion that Germany is standing in judgement over other countries and their economic performance could lead sensitive souls to believe that Bonn is assuming a domineering role in the process of European union.

A Well, the reason behind the Maasricht treaty was to bind Germany's relative might into stable structures. One can't have it both ways. As for how others see Germany's assertiveness on the European question, it is never going to be easy for us. Many tell us to be more self-confident. Britain and France surely want this self-confidence to be properly directed. No one would want to see Germany blowing in the wind. If Germany is not bound into firm European structures, the dangers are far greater.

Q The Germans themselves have doubts about the wisdom of currency union. According to a recent opinion poll only 24 per cent of Germans said they would support it if consulted, as opposed to 33 per cent of Britons. If the voters are so unimpressed, why are the politicians rushing ahead?

A You know, in facing all the key European debates of the post-war years, it has always been easy to mobilise majorities against them in opinion polls. Think of Germany's entry into Nato in the 1950s- there was strong opposition to that, but if we had not gone into Nato, we might not have thrived so well in the decades since. The enacting of the Nato twin-track decision by the Kohl government in 1983 was also against the polls. But from the moment that a government decides something and convincingly explains the decision, it can change perceptions. That is the strength of the parliamentary system. We have often won elections after such controversial decisions. The important thing is that Germany remains reliable. We signed the Maastricht treaty and ratified it. It is in force. We must respect it.

Q But that assumes that you have managed to convince people that the decision is right. In fact, the numbers of people opposed seems to be growing, rather than lessening.

A Convincing people is more easily done, in my view, when the decision is clear in all its details. We can do more explanatory work once it is clear that the currency union will be ready to go ahead in 1999, when people know what the currency will be called and perhaps what the notes will look like. As long as there are still uncertainties, the arguments against monetary union are always more convincing. But it should not prevent us trying to realise what we consider to be necessary and beneficial for the continent.

Q Tony Blair is considering a referendum on Emu if he wins the next election. There is some pressure in your own party to do the same. Have you considered such a step?

A I am not a great fan of referendums. The great decisions of British history in this century were not made by referendum. Politicians try to conceal their own lack of conviction behind referendums. After the war in Germany, we learned from the example of the great Anglo-Saxon democracies that the constitutionally anchored institutions of parliament and government are elected to make decisions, not referendums. Now oddly, there are some people in Britain who see that differently-after we have managed so well with the lessons we learned from that tradition.

Q It is sometimes said that in German politics there are three truly important constituencies-the political class, the masses and the Bundesbank-and that great changes can only be made successfully if at least two of these three groups are in support of the project. When it comes to currency union however, both the masses and the Bundesbank are unconvinced. That leaves only the politicians. Is that not a rather insecure basis for such a sweeping change in a country where the strong Deutschmark is so important?

A If the political class is worth its salt, it leads opinion rather than follows it. Wait for the next election in 1998. That will be the best indication of whether we have support or not. As for our identity, I am convinced that the soul of Germany is Europe, not the Deutschmark. As for the Bundesbank, one has to remember that the German government asked the Bank before concluding the Maasricht treaty what was necessary in its eyes for a successful European currency. The Bundesbank's recommendations are included in the criteria for currency union. When I talk to Herr Tietmeyer [the head of the Bundesbank], he stresses that he is not against a common currency as long as these criteria are strictly observed. The role of the bank is to warn of any dangers to the stability of the new currency. That is right and good.

Q But the Deutschmark is losing value fast against the Swiss Franc. Do you not worry that a common currency would be less stable than the Deutschmark? The qualification criteria, however tight, are no guarantee of stability after monetary union has taken place.

A Your first point supports my theory that uncertainty about the form and timing of the currency union breeds instability, rather than the prospect itself. Why should a European bank, which will be as independent as the Bundesbank, be less effective in guaranteeing the stability of a currency than that bank has been? The temptation when one has done something particularly well-and no-one doubts that the Bundesbank has fulfilled its task admirably-is to think that others won't come up to scratch. It has worked up to now. Why shouldn't it work in the future?

Q Do you still consider the French-German relationship as the core of the European project?

A I would put it differently. It Germany and France are set against one another, then there can be no harmony on the continent. But we would much rather have a Germany-France-Britain axis-and ideally Italy too.

Q Perhaps we could come back to the planned expansion to include the Visegrad states of eastern Europe. When one looks beyond the agreeable rhetoric of "both widening and deepening," the idea of a fast-moving "core-Europe" is difficult to reconcile with a widened Europe, which has led to fears in eastern countries that their membership may be delayed. Would it not be more honest to prioritise one set of aims over another, instead of promising both in the short to medium term?

A As Europe gets bigger, it gets more difficult to co-ordinate and trickier to build consensus. That is why it strikes me as essential that we should strive for institutional reforms-we can continue to debate about the details-whose aim is the building of a common will and the efficiency of decision-making processes and structures. Otherwise, this Europe of ours will be unable to act under pressure and in serious situations.

Q What about Russia's suspicion that a strengthened EU would enforce a "cordon sanitaire," and a new division between east and west.

A We owe it to the Visegrad countries first and foremost to shore-up their economic progress and their stability. West Germany was stabilised with the help of democratic Europe in 1945. Now it is our turn to perform the same role vis-?vis Poland, Hungary and the Czech and Slovak republics.

Q You have left Ukraine out of this analysis.

A A stable Poland is always good for Ukraine. Maybe we will find new and better forms of co-operation one day with a truly democratic Russia to reassure Ukraine. For now, we just have to do what is within our power.

Q You speak of the benefits of a common foreign and security policy. We have seen in the disintegration of Yugoslavia that when Europe is confronted by grave conflict, reactions and perceptions of interests do vary along national lines.

A I see that as a decisive catastrophe-our inability to forge a common policy will cost lives and suffering. Now we have found that will-but belatedly. In 1995 we are more united in our will than in 1991. Don't misunderstand me. Germany contributed its share to the misunderstandings. After 45 years of division and somewhat limited sovereignty, we Germans needed time to get used to our role.

Q Would you support an expansion of the German military role in any future conflicts in Europe? And would you have favoured the use of German ground troops as part of the United Nations force in the former Yugoslavia?

A Fundamentally, we must have the same rights and duties as other countries. That does not rule out further discussion about Germany's contribution in concrete cases about what participation would be helpful and what might be harmful. I still think it would be wise in the former Yugoslavia to contain the presence of German forces, after a peace deal, to those places where they would not come into direct contact with the Serbs. We are only starting now to have a balanced debate about all this in Germany. Of course, the Bundeswehr does not have the same skills and experience as France and Britain. But the basic point is now clear, in my view-no special role for Germany.

Q In domestic politics, you have stressed the need to secure Germany's future as an industrial base. Nonetheless, many German firms are moving their production abroad. Do you consider structural changes necessary?

A Not only in Germany. We must all respond to the challenge of the globalisation of markets by sinking our production costs and improving our innovation skills. But I don't belong to the Jeremiahs who prophesy a decline in Germany. After all, we are not exactly failures when it comes to exports.

Q Would that not entail a tougher reckoning with the trade unions? Some critics in German industry find it ironic that Tony Blair promises to be tougher on the unions than a Christian-Democrat government in Germany.

A We are starting from different premises in our two countries when it comes to the unions. The less confrontational style of the German trade unions has lent us greater social stability than in Britain. It also means that the unions find it easier to make changes from within. When there are disagreements -even substantial ones-we have always found a way to resolve them and I am proud of that and hope that we can sustain this relationship. But I would add that I have a great respect for what Tony Blair has achieved. I admire his dynamism and his appetite for change, and he is an optimist about Europe, which is comforting for us.

Q You have often been mooted as a possible successor to Chancellor Kohl. If he decides not to stand again in the election in 1998, would you put forward your candidature?

A That is a question which we will only discuss when it arises. The German Social Democrats are making a big mistake by carrying out their discussions over the appropriation of top posts publicly and we will not do this. Helmut Kohl is a very successful Chancellor and a strong leader and we want to hang on to him. I have enough self-confidence to see my own role as satisfying. He is Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of German unity. I am Wolfgang Schäuble, floor-lead in the Bundestag.

Q That suggests that you expect Chancellor Kohl to continue into another term.

A We will deal with that when it arises. He has said he will let us know his intentions in good time.

Q It is five years ago to the day exactly since the attempt on your life which crippled you. What significance does this anniversary have for you?

A Well, of course, October 12th is a date which is burned into my mind. But I do not take it as a cause for reflection. What happened was just a terrible misfortune and that is the way I deal with it.

Q Speculation about your future political career inevitably refers to your disability. Does it frustrate you that in discussing the question of leadership, the subject looms so large?

A No. It is a completely legitimate matter for discussion. I gave my condition a lot of thought before I carried on in politics and before I changed my job from interior minister to floor-leader. I think it has gone well and I have to hope that people will trust my judgement, namely that I wouldn't do the job if I didn't feel I was up to it. But I have no problems with people discussing my disability. It certainly doesn't embarrass me. I'd rather they talked about it calmly and openly than suppressed questions.

Q Has being wheelchair-bound altered your character?

A My wife says I haven't got any better. I always reply that I haven't got any worse either. My opponents in the Bundestag used to say I had got harder, my children tell me I am more prepared to listen. My brother says that I haven't changed at all - I am inclined to believe him.