In the November issue of Prospect, Jim Gallagher argued that there is a way to solve the “English question”—how to give England a voice within the United Kingdom. The radical solution of pure federalism is in his view unworkable. A better answer, he says, lies in changes to parliamentary procedure that would allow English MPs alone to participate in certain stages of the reading of bills. But that wouldn’t solve all the problems with the distribution of power and wealth in the UK, to which the devolution of economic powers to the cities and regions is part of the answer. We invited three members of our “Blueprint for Britain” panel to respond.

England will always call most of the shots 

John Kerr

Creating a two-tier Westminster parliament, along the lines recommended by Malcolm Rifkind and Kenneth Clarke, which Jim Gallagher endorses with modifications, would be logical and feasible. But the question is whether it would strengthen the Union for which David Cameron campaigned and Scotland voted. When the Prime Minister announced, within an hour of the result, that Scottish MPs’ rights must be cut “in tandem with” the promised further devolution, a link not mentioned when the promise was made, it didn’t feel like statesmanship. To Scots, no slouches at grievances, it smelt more of sharp practice and party advantage. 

The Scots have always had their own legal and education systems—devolution isn’t new, but the rule has always been that the party with most Westminster support must be allowed to form the government, and all its supporters must be allowed to support all its bills. The British philosophy is pragmatism—what matters is what works. The English, 17 out of every 20 voters, will always call most shots: and the right answer to their “West Lothian question,” at least for now, is “Get over it.” 

The rational, Cartesian French have long called for a two-tier Strasbourg parliament. The logic is impeccable. With the Brits outside monetary, fiscal and now banking union, why should their MEPs vote on eurozone laws? Disbarring them wouldn’t require treaty change: the European parliament adopts its rules of procedure autonomously. Cameron has rightly resisted, stressing the importance of an integral single market and the folly of deliberately widening the Channel. And he has won, at least for the present: the new parliament has set up no eurozone-only structures, and, though Ukip rarely exercise theirs, no UK MEP has lost any voting rights. From this month, eurozone countries have a qualified majority in European Council votes, but Jean-Claude Juncker, the President of the European Commission, argues that all EU laws must take account of all EU members’ interests; and has made commissioner Jonathan Hill responsible for the laws of the banking union the Brits didn’t join. That’s statesmanship.

Gallagher is dead right about the role of the House of Lords. In a union of greater devolution, what would make for greater cohesion, without challenging the unity or supremacy of the Commons, would be a second chamber indirectly elected, at least in part, by the devolved parliaments, London and perhaps the English regions. The Scottish National Party would have to drop its illogical objection to taking Lords as well as Commons seats; and other parties would have to stop seeing peerages as patronage. But this isn’t back-of-the-envelope stuff: updating the constitution deserves careful consultation, and perhaps a convention to be held once the 2015 election is over, and with it the risk that rushed piecemeal change is perceived as reflecting party advantage, not overall UK interests.

John Kerr of Kinlochard, former Permanent Secretary of the Foreign & Commonwealth Office, is an independent member of the House of Lords 

The solution to the English question  lies in the cities and regions 

Vernon Bogdanor

Jim Gallagher appreciates that “English votes for English laws” is unworkable. It would mean that, whenever a government depended on Scottish MPs for its majority, as could occur if Labour were narrowly elected in 2015, there would be a UK majority—Labour—for non-devolved matters such as foreign affairs and economics, but an alternative majority—non-Labour—for devolved matters.

But a bifurcated system of Cabinet government is an absurdity. The Cabinet must be collectively responsible to parliament for all the policies that come before it, not just a selection of them.

It is also hardly possible to separate English matters from Scottish. Even if all control of income tax were devolved to Scotland, the bulk of Holyrood’s revenue would still come from Westminster. This means that any variation in spending on an English service such as health would have a knock-on effect in Scotland. Suppose that there is a cut on health spending in England. The block grant to Scotland would be correspondingly reduced since it is fixed as a percentage of English expenditure. That is why Scotland’s MPs must continue to vote on what seem to be English issues. As the Royal Commission on the Constitution concluded in 1973, “Any issue in Westminster involving expenditure of public money is of concern to all parts of the UK since it may directly affect the level of taxation and indirectly influence the level of a region’s own expenditure.” There are, therefore, no specifically “English” domestic matters involving public expenditure.

Gallagher is, however, sympathetic to the proposal of the McKay Commission to the effect that the committee stage of “English” legislation be dealt with by an English Grand Committee, with membership proportional to the strength of the parties in England. But under this proposal, whenever the UK majority differs from the English majority, the government would have regularly to overturn any amendments made at committee stage. Otherwise whole swathes of its legislation—on education, health, and other matters devolved to Scotland—would be outside its control. The McKay proposal is a recipe for turning bifurcated government into deadlocked government. 

All proposals to create a separate procedure for “English” legislation are separatist in effect, since they seek to separate two systems of government—the English and the Scottish—which must be brought together if the Union is to be strengthened. It is no accident that the SNP has a settled policy of not voting on “English” laws for it is an openly separatist party. It is odd to find unionists following suit.

Gallagher is right, however, to seek the answer to the English question in devolution to local government and to city regions. But local government, as at present constituted, attracts little allegiance. Indeed, turnout at local government elections is around the lowest in western Europe. Therefore, a precondition of devolution in England must be the reform and rejuvenation of local government. That will of course take time. But a constitution is for life, not just for Christmas.

Vernon Bogdanor is professor of government at King’s College London. His books include “The New British Constitution”

A written constitution will help 

Elizabeth Gibson-Morgan

After rightly acknowledging the anomaly of the English exception in the devolution process, Jim Gallagher puts forward three main options. Rather than reducing the number of Scottish MPs, he favours the setting-up of an English Grand Committee that would be in charge of the report stage of English bills. Yet this would not put an end to the controversy over Scottish MPs’ double mandate—Welsh assembly members can no longer be members of the House of Commons under present legislation, prior to the passage of the current Wales bill. It would also leave the anomaly of two kinds of MPs with different powers and responsibilities.

He then proposes the creation of a “minister with overall responsibility for the Union” at the head of a new ministerial department. But the Deputy Prime Minister is currently in charge of constitutional reform (including devolution) under the supervision of the Commons select committee on political and constitutional reform. One might ask whether setting-up yet another ministry would not lead to overlapping competences between the minister for the Union and the minister in charge of constitutional reform. But certainly the present Scottish and Welsh offices appear to be redundant. 

Gallagher also focuses on the need to rethink the function of the House of Lords. However, I think that “supervising the territorial constitution” can be better done by the UK Supreme Court which was allocated the devolution jurisdiction of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in 2009. It is unfortunate that Gallagher does not mention this very important judicial body, even though, under a codified constitution of the sort he favours (as do I), the Supreme Court would have a key role to play as a court with full constitutional review power. 

It is essential to think of a wider legal framework and a new distribution of power, not only between England and Scotland, but between the four different nations and the UK as a whole. Aggravating the asymmetrical nature of the current devolution process can only fuel resentment and nationalist feelings in both England and Scotland, and is bound to lead in the long-run to a new referendum on independence in Scotland. A codified constitution is long overdue. France and the US have one. Why not the UK?

Elizabeth Gibson-Morgan is a visiting senior research fellow at the Institute of Contemporary British History at King’s College London