Edward Pearce has had the excellent idea of writing biographies of three outstanding postwar politicians who failed to become prime minister-RA Butler, Denis Healey and Iain Macleod. Nearly 20 years ago Richard Thorpe had a similar idea; his The Uncrowned Prime Ministers contains studies of Austen Chamberlain, Curzon and Butler. Pearce does it differently, but equally well.
He has always been a vivid writer, sometimes, perhaps, too colourful-but here he has his virtuosity under full control. His judgements, too, are sharp, causing heavy casualties among those politicians he dislikes. He sensibly does not produce a general thesis on why some people become prime minister and others, often more gifted, do not. Yet his studies of the two Tory politicians whom he does like imply the question: does the Conservative party invariably choose the wrong leader?
Although William Hague is a highly intelligent man, Kenneth Clarke was the only fully qualified candidate this year, an obvious leader to virtually everyone but the besotted anti-European majority of the truncated parliamentary party. Equally clearly, John Major was the least qualified of the candidates on offer in 1990. Both Douglas Hurd and Michael Heseltine would surely have made far better leaders. Yet unerringly, a large majority of the party plumped for Major.
It was different in 1975. It would be hard to argue that the party made the wrong decision when its successful candidate won the next three general elections. Yet its choice was at least partly fortuitous. If a number of Whitelaw supporters had not voted for Margaret Thatcher in order to remove Ted Heath, she would not have been elected; and if Edward du Cann had stood, he would probably have been elected on the first ballot.
Of those who stood in 1965, the parliamentary party was right to prefer (narrowly) Heath to Reginald Maudling. But Iain Macleod, the best qualified candidate, was unable to stand because of lack of support. His far-sighted policies in Africa had alienated the white settlers-described by Pearce as "Croydon on horseback"-and consequently their right-wing supporters in the House of Commons.
Two years earlier the Conservative party had ended up with the worst available candidate. Alec Home, about whom Pearce is particularly lethal, was the one most likely to lose the looming general election. Quintin Hogg, Butler and Maudling, as well as two much darker horses, Macleod and Heath, would all have been better. Any of these would almost certainly have won the 1964 election.
The party cannot strictly be said to have chosen Home. There were no proper electoral procedures; under the old system the winner was said to "emerge." But like the proverbial rabbit, Home did not simply "emerge"-a good deal of conjuring was necessary before his name appeared out of Harold Macmillan's hat. At the very least, however, a large minority of the parliamentary party supported the candidate most likely to lead them to defeat.
In 1957 the great majority of the cabinet preferred Macmillan to Butler; almost certainly the parliamentary party felt the same. Pearce thinks they were mistaken; he takes a low view of Macmillan. But although Butler was less culpable over Suez than the victor, Pearce concedes that he "can be faulted" over it. Butler had indeed shown himself to be wretchedly indecisive.
May 1940 was the one time when the Conservatives unquestionably chose the right leader; luckily the parliamentary party, as in 1955, had nothing to do with selecting him. If it had been allowed a say, it would have chosen not Churchill but Lord Halifax. Even if the Conservative party does not always choose the wrong leader, it can usually be relied on to have a good shot at doing so.
Despite its often wayward choice of leader, electorally the Conservative party has been remarkably successful. In contrast, Labour has had until recently a disastrous electoral record. But it has usually chosen the right leader. Only in 1980 did Labour make an obvious mistake in preferring Michael Foot to Denis Healey, Pearce's third subject. For all his great qualities, Foot was not a suitable leader at that time. But like the Tories in 1963, Labour decided to please themselves rather than the electorate. So Healey missed the chance of becoming prime minister, although even he would have had a small chance of reaching Downing Street by winning either the 1983 or the 1987 election.
Pearce's book is a pithy commentary on British politics from the 1930s to the present day. Apart from a surprising blind spot about Churchill and the postwar government, he is a reliable and entertaining guide to much of the history of the past 60 years.
A footnote on Iain Macleod's drinking habits: on the high authority of Alan Watkins, Macleod is said to have been an "American drinker"-two large dry martinis before lunch, then water with food. That was true of his last couple of years and earlier, when he was answering questions in parliament. At other times he enjoyed drinking a lot of port at both lunch and dinner. Even though it dulled the pain of Macleod's disability, Mr Hague's management consultants would not have approved.
The lost leaders
Edward Pearce
Little, Brown 1997, ?18.99
