The Invincible Quest: the Life of Richard Milhous Nixon, by Conrad Black
(Quercis, £30)
Conrad Black, writing in what he describes as "very distracting circumstances, as I prepared at the same time to deal with serious judicial problems," has a morality tale to tell, at the length of 1,059 pages. There was once a "very competent and successful" leader who "dealt decisively with all the problems he faced." But the leader had bitter, vindictive enemies and he made one serious mistake. "In a fair proceeding it would not have been easy to prove that he had committed a crime that justified his removal from office." But there was no fairness, and he was hounded out.
The great leader made a "dignified exit" and "always put the national interest above all other considerations." Although able to do so, "he would not consider giving himself a pardon, nor would he consider seeking asylum in France, China, Chile, Egypt or any of the many other countries that would have been happy to accord it to him." Instead, after a "masterpiece" of a farewell address, he left "quietly and without recrimination."
With the passage of time has come rehabilitation and vindication. The nation now feels "remorse" for the way the great leader was "mistreated," and he will go down in history "in the category of unusually talented presidents who are just beneath the very greatest," becoming "a mighty and mythic figure."
No prizes for breaking the code. The last chapter, "The Transfiguration," calls Nixon "the most successful ex-president in the country's history." The ex-proprietor is clearly in his footsteps, without (one assumes) the benefit of a presidential pardon, nor even asylum in China or Chile.
It is ridiculous to claim that Nixon was just beneath the greatest presidents. Excusing him Watergate and relying on the rest is like excusing Hoover the depression, or Johnson Vietnam, and claiming greatness for their successes in lesser spheres. Black is not even able to argue that Nixon was "great" in all areas other than Watergate. On Vietnam, he criticises Nixon for a fatal year of inaction followed by misjudged ultimatums; as a result, Nixon "lost… the option of just leaving, and appeared to have lost the option of winning also, since he was leaving gradually." Years more of bloodshed and defeat lay ahead until Nixon effectively took the first course.
Even if he wasn't great, Nixon was in some areas correct and effective, even courageous, and Black documents these while adding little to Stephen Ambrose's three-volume biography and other recent studies, including Margaret MacMillan's brilliant Nixon in China. But even when describing Nixon's achievements, Black's account often lacks balance or insight. Consider school desegregation, of which Black says: "Like a number of Nixon's acts of selfless idealism… it went largely unrecognised until historians started to unearth the facts." Yet the facts reveal not a selfless idealist but a calculating and cynical (if, on this issue, progressive) politician in search of survival. This is painstakingly established by Gareth Davies in his new book on American education, See Government Grow, which documents how, after an initial struggle to avoid acting on the issue, Nixon worried that George Wallace would run against him in 1972 and would poll strongly in the south if desegregation was still raging. Nixon told his domestic affairs counsel John Ehrlichman that it was "in our interest, politically, to get the issue behind us now," and have "confrontations this year [1970] rather than in '72."
Davies also analyses—hence his book's title—how Nixon allowed the federal education budget to grow massively, despite the fiscal conservatism which Black hails as one of Nixon's prime contributions to the revival of the right. It may have been laudable in the lexicon of the liberals, who Nixon hated so much, but it was not intended and it was largely necessitated by the weakness of his political position.
Black's most egregious misconception is that Nixon "took a terribly divided and angry and demoralised country and solved its principal problems." In truth, he left the country at least as divided and angry and demoralised as he found it. Invincibility? Transfiguration? Not in this life.
Conrad Black, writing in what he describes as "very distracting circumstances, as I prepared at the same time to deal with serious judicial problems," has a morality tale to tell, at the length of 1,059 pages. There was once a "very competent and successful" leader who "dealt decisively with all the problems he faced." But the leader had bitter, vindictive enemies and he made one serious mistake. "In a fair proceeding it would not have been easy to prove that he had committed a crime that justified his removal from office." But there was no fairness, and he was hounded out.
The great leader made a "dignified exit" and "always put the national interest above all other considerations." Although able to do so, "he would not consider giving himself a pardon, nor would he consider seeking asylum in France, China, Chile, Egypt or any of the many other countries that would have been happy to accord it to him." Instead, after a "masterpiece" of a farewell address, he left "quietly and without recrimination."
With the passage of time has come rehabilitation and vindication. The nation now feels "remorse" for the way the great leader was "mistreated," and he will go down in history "in the category of unusually talented presidents who are just beneath the very greatest," becoming "a mighty and mythic figure."
No prizes for breaking the code. The last chapter, "The Transfiguration," calls Nixon "the most successful ex-president in the country's history." The ex-proprietor is clearly in his footsteps, without (one assumes) the benefit of a presidential pardon, nor even asylum in China or Chile.
It is ridiculous to claim that Nixon was just beneath the greatest presidents. Excusing him Watergate and relying on the rest is like excusing Hoover the depression, or Johnson Vietnam, and claiming greatness for their successes in lesser spheres. Black is not even able to argue that Nixon was "great" in all areas other than Watergate. On Vietnam, he criticises Nixon for a fatal year of inaction followed by misjudged ultimatums; as a result, Nixon "lost… the option of just leaving, and appeared to have lost the option of winning also, since he was leaving gradually." Years more of bloodshed and defeat lay ahead until Nixon effectively took the first course.
Even if he wasn't great, Nixon was in some areas correct and effective, even courageous, and Black documents these while adding little to Stephen Ambrose's three-volume biography and other recent studies, including Margaret MacMillan's brilliant Nixon in China. But even when describing Nixon's achievements, Black's account often lacks balance or insight. Consider school desegregation, of which Black says: "Like a number of Nixon's acts of selfless idealism… it went largely unrecognised until historians started to unearth the facts." Yet the facts reveal not a selfless idealist but a calculating and cynical (if, on this issue, progressive) politician in search of survival. This is painstakingly established by Gareth Davies in his new book on American education, See Government Grow, which documents how, after an initial struggle to avoid acting on the issue, Nixon worried that George Wallace would run against him in 1972 and would poll strongly in the south if desegregation was still raging. Nixon told his domestic affairs counsel John Ehrlichman that it was "in our interest, politically, to get the issue behind us now," and have "confrontations this year [1970] rather than in '72."
Davies also analyses—hence his book's title—how Nixon allowed the federal education budget to grow massively, despite the fiscal conservatism which Black hails as one of Nixon's prime contributions to the revival of the right. It may have been laudable in the lexicon of the liberals, who Nixon hated so much, but it was not intended and it was largely necessitated by the weakness of his political position.
Black's most egregious misconception is that Nixon "took a terribly divided and angry and demoralised country and solved its principal problems." In truth, he left the country at least as divided and angry and demoralised as he found it. Invincibility? Transfiguration? Not in this life.
