Taking Command by David Richards (Headline, £20)
It’s extremely rare for a genuine maverick to become a general, still less to become Chief of the General Staff and then of the Defence Staff. David Richards reached that pinnacle despite a career of remarkable independence and outspokenness.
Most notoriously he ignored explicit orders to stay on the sidelines of the Sierra Leone civil war and successfully rescued that country from the depredations of the hand-chopping Revolutionary United Front militia. Later, unlike his more deferential predecessors and successors, he forcefully, sometimes publicly, fought with the government about defence cuts and inadequate military resources in Afghanistan. Among the secrets of Richards’s success were a rare understanding of and willingness to use the media, and his ability to befriend allied generals and politicians, especially Afghan and American ones.
His memoir is, rather like its author, a breezy, cheerful, fast-moving affair. It’s also, contrary to his reputation, disappointingly discreet. More than you would expect, or hope, you have to read between the lines to figure out what Richards really thought of key individuals.
That said, Richards spills the beans about the refusal of his superiors to heed sensible suggestions for a different policy in Baghdad in 2003, about the lethal arrogance of some senior British officers in Afghanistan and about the inexperience of Canadian forces there.
The most interesting and unusual part of the book is the three chapters composed of a diary he kept when in command of the Nato effort in Afghanistan. An unexpurgated version of these will be immensely useful for future historians.
It’s extremely rare for a genuine maverick to become a general, still less to become Chief of the General Staff and then of the Defence Staff. David Richards reached that pinnacle despite a career of remarkable independence and outspokenness.
Most notoriously he ignored explicit orders to stay on the sidelines of the Sierra Leone civil war and successfully rescued that country from the depredations of the hand-chopping Revolutionary United Front militia. Later, unlike his more deferential predecessors and successors, he forcefully, sometimes publicly, fought with the government about defence cuts and inadequate military resources in Afghanistan. Among the secrets of Richards’s success were a rare understanding of and willingness to use the media, and his ability to befriend allied generals and politicians, especially Afghan and American ones.
His memoir is, rather like its author, a breezy, cheerful, fast-moving affair. It’s also, contrary to his reputation, disappointingly discreet. More than you would expect, or hope, you have to read between the lines to figure out what Richards really thought of key individuals.
That said, Richards spills the beans about the refusal of his superiors to heed sensible suggestions for a different policy in Baghdad in 2003, about the lethal arrogance of some senior British officers in Afghanistan and about the inexperience of Canadian forces there.
The most interesting and unusual part of the book is the three chapters composed of a diary he kept when in command of the Nato effort in Afghanistan. An unexpurgated version of these will be immensely useful for future historians.
