Read more: Twelve things you need to know about Brexit
What are the implications of not being a member of the European Union in today’s Europe? The UK's situation is unique in that no sovereign state has thus far left the EU. Norway and to a lesser extent Switzerland, both of which qualify for EU membership but have decided not to join, provide the most relevant case studies of the effects of close association without EU membership, which Brexit most likely would entail.
In 1994, 52.2 per cent of the Norwegian population voted against joining the EU in a referendum. Among the most frequently cited reasons for voting “no” was the need to protect democracy and sovereignty. At that time, most Norwegians were presumably unaware that through their membership of the European Economic Area (EEA), Schengen association agreements, agreements on asylum and police cooperation (Dublin I and II), and agreements on foreign and security policy, they would end up adopting around three quarters of EU legislation anyway. At present, 40 percent of the rules and regulations it incorporates are in the field of agriculture, which was excluded from the initial EEA Agreement. It is often said in Norway that the “no” side won on the day of the referendum, but has lost every day since.
The EEA Agreement has shown itself to be highly dynamic, and successive Norwegian governments of all political stripes have sought to maintain a close relationship to the EU. Norway’s relationship to the EU is multilateral because the EEA is managed through the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). But the relationship between the three EEA members of EFTA (Norway, Iceland and Lichtenstein) and the EU’s 28 member-states is extremely lopsided, and the reality is that the EU is a rule-maker and these EEA countries are rule-takers.
Switzerland’s relationship to the EU is bilateral and regulated through a host of agreements. The country is in EFTA but the Swiss rejected membership of the EEA by 50.3 per cent in a referendum in 1992, after which its government suspended negotiations for EU membership. However, since the mid-1980s Switzerland has also sought to ensure that its legislative proposals are EU-compatible. The upshot is that whereas its arrangement with the EU theoretically has more scope for Swiss influence, it is in reality quite similar to that of Norway.
So, it is not a case of choosing the Norwegian model—the critical issue is the structure of the relationship with the EU: The closer the relationship a non-member has to the EU the more the EU sets the terms of operation for that state. It is often noted that a closely affiliated non-member such as Norway lacks access to those bodies where member states shape decisions in common in the EU, notably the European Council, the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament. However, the EU increasingly affects the scope and terms of affiliated states’ self-determination as well. In this relationship the EU comes across as a hegemon—ironically, as it was never established as one.
Another thing to consider is how the particular form of affiliation shapes the nature and conduct of politics. The EU is said to be marked by executive dominance; in the case of the EEA that effect is even more pronounced. If the Norwegian government wants any influence on decisions it has to be proactive, thus limiting the scope for public consultation. Legislative acts are handled in the EEA system after the decision has been reached in the EU, and there is strong pressure to pass them rapidly and ensure legal homogeneity across the 31-member EEA. It follows that Norwegian civil society is one step behind the decision processes.
A further problem is de-politicization. In Norway's parliament, the Storting, the issue of EU adaption is not much discussed, especially not the constitutional and democratic implications of this form of EU affiliation. Party political agreements effectively ensure that the issue of EU membership is kept off the political agenda. On the one hand, the effect is that the constitutional implications of the cumulative process of EU adaptation are not well understood. On the other, individual issues or novel EU legislation rarely get politicized in part because their broader societal ramifications are not highlighted.
What these developments entail for political culture and trust has not been fully examined, especially when such a broad range of issues is de facto beyond the purview of politics. We might conjecture that such a system would foster anti-elitist right and left-wing populism. It is also conceivable that politics would turn more local and/or focuses on issues that people think they can affect. In terms of democracy as a system of self-government, all of the factors mentioned here can be considered to be pathologies and manifestations of political impotence.
Will the UK end up in the same boat as Norway? The range of choices is more limited than the Leave side admits, because the structure of the association matters so much. In the event that Brexit occurs and the UK becomes an affiliated member, the more closely associated to the EU it becomes, the more it will end up experiencing the same challenges. Even a desire for “mere” market access is tricky because it presumes that such access can be isolated from the other issues bound up with it. The UK's size and influence give it a better chance of staking its own course that Norway or Switzerland have. Yet it seems quite unlikely that it can obtain an agreement that will avoid all the pathological effects that Norway and Switzerland experience.
What are the implications of not being a member of the European Union in today’s Europe? The UK's situation is unique in that no sovereign state has thus far left the EU. Norway and to a lesser extent Switzerland, both of which qualify for EU membership but have decided not to join, provide the most relevant case studies of the effects of close association without EU membership, which Brexit most likely would entail.
In 1994, 52.2 per cent of the Norwegian population voted against joining the EU in a referendum. Among the most frequently cited reasons for voting “no” was the need to protect democracy and sovereignty. At that time, most Norwegians were presumably unaware that through their membership of the European Economic Area (EEA), Schengen association agreements, agreements on asylum and police cooperation (Dublin I and II), and agreements on foreign and security policy, they would end up adopting around three quarters of EU legislation anyway. At present, 40 percent of the rules and regulations it incorporates are in the field of agriculture, which was excluded from the initial EEA Agreement. It is often said in Norway that the “no” side won on the day of the referendum, but has lost every day since.
The EEA Agreement has shown itself to be highly dynamic, and successive Norwegian governments of all political stripes have sought to maintain a close relationship to the EU. Norway’s relationship to the EU is multilateral because the EEA is managed through the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). But the relationship between the three EEA members of EFTA (Norway, Iceland and Lichtenstein) and the EU’s 28 member-states is extremely lopsided, and the reality is that the EU is a rule-maker and these EEA countries are rule-takers.
Switzerland’s relationship to the EU is bilateral and regulated through a host of agreements. The country is in EFTA but the Swiss rejected membership of the EEA by 50.3 per cent in a referendum in 1992, after which its government suspended negotiations for EU membership. However, since the mid-1980s Switzerland has also sought to ensure that its legislative proposals are EU-compatible. The upshot is that whereas its arrangement with the EU theoretically has more scope for Swiss influence, it is in reality quite similar to that of Norway.
So, it is not a case of choosing the Norwegian model—the critical issue is the structure of the relationship with the EU: The closer the relationship a non-member has to the EU the more the EU sets the terms of operation for that state. It is often noted that a closely affiliated non-member such as Norway lacks access to those bodies where member states shape decisions in common in the EU, notably the European Council, the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament. However, the EU increasingly affects the scope and terms of affiliated states’ self-determination as well. In this relationship the EU comes across as a hegemon—ironically, as it was never established as one.
Another thing to consider is how the particular form of affiliation shapes the nature and conduct of politics. The EU is said to be marked by executive dominance; in the case of the EEA that effect is even more pronounced. If the Norwegian government wants any influence on decisions it has to be proactive, thus limiting the scope for public consultation. Legislative acts are handled in the EEA system after the decision has been reached in the EU, and there is strong pressure to pass them rapidly and ensure legal homogeneity across the 31-member EEA. It follows that Norwegian civil society is one step behind the decision processes.
A further problem is de-politicization. In Norway's parliament, the Storting, the issue of EU adaption is not much discussed, especially not the constitutional and democratic implications of this form of EU affiliation. Party political agreements effectively ensure that the issue of EU membership is kept off the political agenda. On the one hand, the effect is that the constitutional implications of the cumulative process of EU adaptation are not well understood. On the other, individual issues or novel EU legislation rarely get politicized in part because their broader societal ramifications are not highlighted.
What these developments entail for political culture and trust has not been fully examined, especially when such a broad range of issues is de facto beyond the purview of politics. We might conjecture that such a system would foster anti-elitist right and left-wing populism. It is also conceivable that politics would turn more local and/or focuses on issues that people think they can affect. In terms of democracy as a system of self-government, all of the factors mentioned here can be considered to be pathologies and manifestations of political impotence.
Will the UK end up in the same boat as Norway? The range of choices is more limited than the Leave side admits, because the structure of the association matters so much. In the event that Brexit occurs and the UK becomes an affiliated member, the more closely associated to the EU it becomes, the more it will end up experiencing the same challenges. Even a desire for “mere” market access is tricky because it presumes that such access can be isolated from the other issues bound up with it. The UK's size and influence give it a better chance of staking its own course that Norway or Switzerland have. Yet it seems quite unlikely that it can obtain an agreement that will avoid all the pathological effects that Norway and Switzerland experience.
