The good, the bad and the ugly in the Iran nuclear deal

The agreement reached in Vienna on 14th July is not a great deal for either Iran or the world powers with whom it was negotiating. But it is good enough and far better than the alternative of the status quo ante.

Less than two years ago, Iran was locked in an increasingly worrisome confrontation with the Western nations, adding more centrifuges as they added more sanctions. In the race between centrifuges and sanctions, the centrifuges were winning as Iran got perilously close to being able to dash to produce nuclear weapons while inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) were hampered with outdated inspection rights. There was good reason to think—and I did—that Iran was heading toward a war with the United States and/or Israel.

The November 2013 interim agreement temporarily stopped the race, and rolled back Iran’s capabilities in some respects. Now, after breaking six deadlines, negotiators have agreed on a 159-page text that sharply reduces Iran’s capabilities in ways I once thought it would never accept. Cutting the centrifuge number by two-thirds and limiting those to the old-fashioned, crash-prone first-generation models for ten years was a significant plus. So too, the agreement to thoroughly revise the Arak reactor so it cannot produce weapons-grade plutonium. The most eye-catching number though was the reduction in the stockpile of low-enriched uranium, to be limited to a mere two per cent of its current size. This is far better than previous attempts to reduce the stockpile size: the October 2009 failed fuel swap and the April 2010 failed attempt by Brazil and Turkey to broker a deal.

Iran has also accepted all the verification provisions of the IAEA Additional Protocol, which allows inspector access anywhere needed, when needed. Fulminations by Iran’s Supreme Leader that inspectors would not be allowed on military bases or to interview nuclear scientists did not prove to be the final word.

With those reductions and with the intrusive IAEA inspections Iran has accepted, the E3+3 powers negotiating with Iran (France, Germany and UK plus China, Russia and US) have met their goal of blocking all of Iran’s potential paths to a nuclear weapon and creating a one-year period so that Iran could not rush to produce highly enriched uranium for a weapon without being caught in time. British and German experts who have experience using the centrifuges in question are confident that the R&D limits mean Iran would not be able to race to a bomb during the period of limits. These are among the good aspects of the deal.

The six powers also made their share of compromises, of course. That is what negotiations are all about. Among these concessions, the sunset provision is the most troubling. There had to be some end date to the limits on Iran’s nuclear programme; no sovereign state would accept having its civilian nuclear technology fettered forever. The 10-15 periods of limits on the nuclear programme are short compared to the 8,000-year history of the Iranian people. Israelis, who as a people have a similar timespan and who have had their nation’s very existence repeatedly threatened by Iran, have reason for concern.

What happens in 15 years if Israel and other concerned states still have reason to suspect Iran of having a nuclear weapons programme in the basement? They will not want to see the break-out time reduced to a matter of days as Iran increases its enrichment capacity by tenfold, as planned. I believe some sanctions should remain in place until reasonable doubts are removed about Iran’s nuclear intentions. This doesn’t mean proving a negative. The IAEA has a tried and true means of being able to certify that all nuclear material in a country is being used for peaceful purposes. It’s called the “broader conclusion” of the Additional Protocol, and it’s a judgment the IAEA has been able to draw about dozens of countries that have faithfully implemented that safeguards instrument. 

Another unfortunate, although probably necessary, compromise is that the enrichment capacity Iran is allowed is not consistent with the practical needs of its civilian nuclear programme, as was the principle reached in the November 2013 interim agreement. Because Russia supplies the fuel for Iran’s only nuclear power plant, there is no practical need for Iran to keep 6,100 centrifuges in place, 5,000 of which will enrich uranium. The number was determined because it fit break-out calculations and for reasons of Iranian pride and future leverage. One might call this the ugly part of the agreement, in contrast to the good and the bad (with apologies to Sergio Leone’s spaghetti Western).

But overall the agreement is worthwhile. It removes for now the threat of an Iranian nuclear weapon. It removes as well the prospect of war as long as the deal is faithfully implemented.

As a bonus, the agreement also opens the prospect for a new page in Iran’s relations with the West. I do not expect that it will lead immediately to an Iran more tolerant at home and less troublesome abroad. Iranian hardliners are already fighting back, ramping up anti-American rhetoric, and cracking down on human rights. But clearing away the nuclear obstacles opens the possibilities for dialogue on other areas of mutual interest that has not been possible for 35 years.