Yesterday, the President of Afghanistan's office said in a statement that it believed Taliban leader Mullah Omar had died in a Pakistan hospital in 2013. Rumours of Omar's death have spread before, but this time both the Afghan and US governments have judged the reports to be credible.
The announcement ends months of confusion about Omar's condition and whereabouts, and if true is likely to send a brewing power struggle in the group's ranks into overdrive. But does this mark the start of a new era for the islamist movement, which ruled Afghanistan from the mid-1990s until 2001? Or will the shockwaves caused by the news tear the group apart?
With the death of Mullah Muhammad Omar, the Taliban movement is at a critical juncture. The changing of the guard comes at a time when Taliban leaders seem to be deeply divided about the future direction of their movement, particularly the peace talks with the Afghan government. The choice of a new successor, Mullah Akhtar Mansour, Omar's longtime deputy, is unlikely to resolve internal tensions and contradictions. Far from it. There was reportedly a fierce opposition to his selection by military and political heavyweights among the Taliban. Mansour is seen as subservient to Pakistan and too forthcoming on the peace talks.
Mansour faces three major challenges in the coming months and years. First, will he be able to unify the ranks of the Taliban and prevent the splintering and fragmenting of the movement further? Although the Taliban is not a monolith, Omar was a unifying historical figure, the glue that kept the movement together from the 1990s until now. A related second question is whether Mansour will fill the shoes of Omar and consolidate his leadership given the extent of internal opposition and resistance to his selection. Thirdly, Mansour faces a serious challenge of poaching by Islamic State (IS). Dozens of field lieutenants have already switched sides to IS and if the bleeding continues, more Taliban commanders might do so. Nevertheless, the Taliban is here to stay, a social-religious movement deeply entrenched in Afghan soil with a significant social base of support.
Mullah Omar was more than a military commander. He draped himself in a cloak believed to have belonged to the Prophet Mohammad in 1996, giving him spiritual as well as earthly grip, venerated as the "Amir-ul-Mumineen"—leader of the faithful. This has prevented splits in the past, and his death may liberate some of his more hard-line followers to defect to Islamic State (IS). But the Taliban is already split between those who are for and against talks with the Afghan government and also between the leadership in Pakistan and the political office in Qatar.
The most interesting question is the timing of the announcement—since Mullah Omar probably died some years ago. Until now, he has been more useful "alive" than "dead," with Taliban statements given more power as they were issued in his name—including a recent one backing peace talks with the Afghan government for the first time. Now both Afghanistan and Pakistan may be confident enough to deal with the Taliban without him.
The announcement ends months of confusion about Omar's condition and whereabouts, and if true is likely to send a brewing power struggle in the group's ranks into overdrive. But does this mark the start of a new era for the islamist movement, which ruled Afghanistan from the mid-1990s until 2001? Or will the shockwaves caused by the news tear the group apart?
This moment is critical
Fawaz A. Gerges, Professor of International Relations at the London School of EconomicsWith the death of Mullah Muhammad Omar, the Taliban movement is at a critical juncture. The changing of the guard comes at a time when Taliban leaders seem to be deeply divided about the future direction of their movement, particularly the peace talks with the Afghan government. The choice of a new successor, Mullah Akhtar Mansour, Omar's longtime deputy, is unlikely to resolve internal tensions and contradictions. Far from it. There was reportedly a fierce opposition to his selection by military and political heavyweights among the Taliban. Mansour is seen as subservient to Pakistan and too forthcoming on the peace talks.
Mansour faces three major challenges in the coming months and years. First, will he be able to unify the ranks of the Taliban and prevent the splintering and fragmenting of the movement further? Although the Taliban is not a monolith, Omar was a unifying historical figure, the glue that kept the movement together from the 1990s until now. A related second question is whether Mansour will fill the shoes of Omar and consolidate his leadership given the extent of internal opposition and resistance to his selection. Thirdly, Mansour faces a serious challenge of poaching by Islamic State (IS). Dozens of field lieutenants have already switched sides to IS and if the bleeding continues, more Taliban commanders might do so. Nevertheless, the Taliban is here to stay, a social-religious movement deeply entrenched in Afghan soil with a significant social base of support.
This is a chance for peace
David Loyn, former BBC Afghanistan correspondentMullah Omar was more than a military commander. He draped himself in a cloak believed to have belonged to the Prophet Mohammad in 1996, giving him spiritual as well as earthly grip, venerated as the "Amir-ul-Mumineen"—leader of the faithful. This has prevented splits in the past, and his death may liberate some of his more hard-line followers to defect to Islamic State (IS). But the Taliban is already split between those who are for and against talks with the Afghan government and also between the leadership in Pakistan and the political office in Qatar.
The most interesting question is the timing of the announcement—since Mullah Omar probably died some years ago. Until now, he has been more useful "alive" than "dead," with Taliban statements given more power as they were issued in his name—including a recent one backing peace talks with the Afghan government for the first time. Now both Afghanistan and Pakistan may be confident enough to deal with the Taliban without him.
